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Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and the Free
Exercise Dilemma: A Structural UnitaryAccommodationist Argument for the Constitutionality of
God in the Public Square
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1620, a small band of religious dissenters 1 embarked on a three
thousand mile journey across the sea. 2 They would encounter storms,
sickness, 3 even death, 4 finally reaching the northeastern American shore
exhausted and ill-prepared for the harsh winter ahead. 5 Nearly half of
their party would die within the year. 6 But they would stay because this
new land was their Zion, a “place where they might have liberty” to
worship God freely. 7 From these historic beginnings, America has

1. These dissenters were Leyden Separatists who believed that true religion could be found
only by “separating” from the Church of England. EDNA BARTH, TURKEYS, PILGRIMS, AND INDIAN
CORN: THE STORY OF THE THANKSGIVING SYMBOLS 16–18 (1975). In this respect, they differed
from the Puritans of Massachusetts Bay who desired only to “purify” the Church of England. Id. at
17.
2. Id. at 28. The trek that would bring the Pilgrims to American soil would take sixty-six
days to complete. Id.
3. Id. at 22–23. Because of the Pilgrims’ late September start, they encountered westerly
gales that were so violent that a main beam in the ship buckled. Id. at 20, 22–23. Many passengers
were ill. Id. at 22. William Bradford, the future governor of Plymouth Colony, recounts, “After they
had enjoyed fair winds and weather for a season, they were encountered many times with cross
winds and met with many fierce storms . . . .” WILLIAM BRADFORD, OF PLYMOUTH PLANTATION
1620–1647, at 58 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1959) (1650).
4. BARTH, supra note 1, at 20. Just two years earlier, one hundred thirty passengers died on
a journey to Virginia with English Separatist Francis Blackwell. Id. On this voyage, a member from
the Mayflower crew died at sea. Id. at 25–26. Blackwell was described as a malicious sailor, having
threatened to throw sick passengers to the sharks and then steal their belongings. Id.
5. RALPH LINTON & ADELIN LINTON, WE GATHER TOGETHER: THE STORY OF
THANKSGIVING 48 (1949). The Pilgrims arrived in December of 1620. Id. A historian notes, “The
devout band which had landed on Plymouth Rock . . . were a courageous and hardworking lot, but
they were ill-equipped, both personally and materially, for hewing a livelihood from a formidable
wilderness.” Id.
6. Of the Pilgrims and crew who left England, approximately half survived. Henry R. Viets,
Some Features of the History of Medicine in Massachusetts During the Colonial Period: (1620–
1770), 23 ISIS 389, 391 (1935).
7. BRADFORD, supra note 3, at 24.
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continued to build in the tradition of religious freedom. This freedom is
the seed of the nation’s conception and a primary end of its existence. 8
Today, statistics indicate that a relatively large percentage of
Americans continue to view religion as a fundamental aspect of their
lives, 9 especially when compared with other industrialized nations. 10
Americans rank among the highest of developed populations for church
attendance and monetary contributions to religious institutions. 11 Some
polls indicate that approximately ninety percent of Americans believe in
the existence of a god, 12 seventy percent pray, 13 and forty percent read
the Bible every week. 14
Despite these numbers indicating continuing spiritual traditions,
religious 15 Americans currently face what has been described as a

8. Describing the mission of the Continental Congress that would form the nation, Thomas
Paine wrote, “The conferring members being met, let their business be to frame a Continental
Charter, or Charter of the United Colonies . . . (Always remembering, that our strength is
continental, not provincial:) Securing freedom and property to all men, and above all things, the free
exercise of religion, according to the dictates of conscience . . . .” THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE
42 (Bantam Classic ed. 2004) (1776).
9. See generally Richard Morin, Do Americans Believe in God?, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
2000, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/wat/archive/wat042400.htm (explaining
that multiple national surveys indicate most Americans firmly believe in God).
10. See KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2d ed. 1997).
11. Id. at 9–12.
12. BARRY A. KOSMIN & SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY 9 (1993) (reporting that fifty-eight percent of Americans
define religion as “very important” and that ninety-four percent believe in “God or [a] universal
spirit”); WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A NATIONAL
DILEMMA 2 (1995) (“Polls consistently show that nine out of ten Americans believe in the existence
of God.”).
13. WARREN A. NORD & CHARLES C. HAYNES, TAKING RELIGION SERIOUSLY ACROSS THE
CURRICULUM 1 (1998) (“The United States is a religious nation. About 90 percent of Americans
claim to believe in God, and almost 80 percent say that religion is an important part of their lives.
Seventy percent of Americans pray and 40 percent attend religious services and read the Bible each
week.”).
14. Id.
15. This Comment uses the term broadly—“religion” or “believers” refer to those who
espouse a religion or belief system that endorses powers other than the “self,” which transcend the
everyday material world and/or control human destiny. Secular, atheistic, or humanistic lines of
thought that recognize no power or existence outside mortality or the “self” are conversely defined
as “secular” and its advocates generally termed “nonbelievers.” See generally Paul James Toscano,
A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 BYU L. REV.
177, 207 (defining religion broadly to include “any belief system that an individual can call a
religion”); PHYLLIS A. TICKLE, RE-DISCOVERING THE SACRED: SPIRITUALITY IN AMERICA 115
(1995) (“So long as religion ties together the experiences of life into some kind of purpose and then
disciplines the actions of living toward that pattern, it will still be religion. It will be religion, in
other words, regardless of whether or not it even mentions God or engages God as a principle.”). But
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culture of disbelief—a legal and political mindset that “belittle[s]
religious devotion, . . . humiliate[s] believers, and, even if indirectly, . . .
discourage[s] religion as a serious activity.” 16 Problematically, this
secular culture infringes on the fundamental right of religious free
exercise by “press[ing] the religiously faithful to be other than
themselves, to act publicly, and sometimes privately as well, as though
their faith does not matter to them.” 17
This culture of disbelief is reflected in different aspects of American
society and life, and is often evidenced in the nation’s judiciary where
courts are torn between a heritage that sanctions the coexistence of
church and the state, 18 and a secular mindset that insists “where
government treads, religion must flee.” 19 Interestingly, in observing the

see George Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO.
L.J. 1519, 1553 (1983) (defining “religion” as meeting certain paradigmatic requisites such as “[a]
belief in a Supreme Being,” “[a] belief in a transcendent reality,” “[a] moral code,” “[a] world view
that provides an account of man’s role in the universe and around which an individual organizes his
life,” “[s]acred rituals and holy days,” “[w]orship and prayer,” “[a] sacred text or scriptures,” and
“[m]embership in a social organization that promotes a religious belief system”).
16. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 16 (1993).
17. Id. at 3; see also Andrew A. Beerworth, Religion in the Marketplace: Establishments,
Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of Free Exercise, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 333, 405 (2004)
(“Christians are no longer thrown to the lions, but they must constantly endure the scorn of postmodernists and pressure by courts to change their ‘illiberal’ beliefs.” (citing Thomas C. Berg, AntiCatholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001))). Speaking of the
American trend toward secularization, William McLoughlin commented, “This country is in more
than an economic crisis. It is in a deep cultural crisis. The beliefs and values that our institutions
have taught us to respect and obey are no longer congruent with the behavior we see around us.”
William G. McLoughlin, Faith, 35 AM. Q. 101 (1983).
18. WALD, supra note 10, at 6 (“The change in terms of thought, from a God-centered to a
human-centered world, is the most dramatic testament to the victory of secularization in the modern
world. This understanding of modern society leaves little room for religion as a social or political
factor.”). President Ronald Reagan noted,
Religion played not only a strong role in our national life; it played a positive role. The
abolitionist movement was at heart a moral and religious movement; so was the modern
civil rights struggle. And throughout this time, the state was tolerant of religious belief,
expression, and practice. Society, too, was tolerant. But in the 1960’s this began to
change. We began to make great steps toward secularizing our nation and removing
religion from its honored place.
Ronald Reagan, Remarks at an Ecumenical Prayer Breakfast in Dallas, Texas (Aug. 23, 1984),
available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/resource/speeches/1984/82384a.htm.
19. MATTHEW D. STAVER, FAITH & FREEDOM: A COMPLETE HANDBOOK FOR DEFENDING
YOUR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 19 (1995); see also Franklin H. Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in
Christian Belief, 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 132, 134 (1964) (“A modern measure of purely private piety
may be useful—particularly in other people, but there is no need for the enlightened man of the
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origins of this distinct trend toward disbelief, it appears that the catalyst
is not located amidst fanatic nonbelievers or dispassionate scholars.
Rather, the forces shifting core American principles are emanating
chiefly from the American polity itself. 20
Paul Blanshard, an outspoken critic of organized religion and writer
for The Humanist, noted the judiciary’s role in the move towards
secularism, naming the United States Supreme Court as his “primary
hero” in the secularization of American society. 21 As a critic of
religion’s role in society, Blanshard’s observations are perceptive.
Twentieth-century courts play a major role in America’s legal and
political secularization, formulating and upholding interpretations of the
First Amendment Establishment Clause that demand “public neutrality
on the widest possible range of moral issues.” 22 Of course, this public
neutrality is neutral in name only 23 because an application of the
Establishment Clause that tends to remove even the most innocuous
references of God from the state produces a secular mindset that is an
orientation unto itself, ultimately discriminating against nonsecular
beliefs. 24
Judicial inconsistency in how the Religion Clause is understood does
little to remedy this secularization dilemma. Over the past century, courts
have applied a variety of interpretations to the Establishment Clause. 25
Some decisions have advocated a “separationist” approach to churchstate relations that wholly precludes church-state interaction. 26 Others
twentieth century to take religion seriously as an intellectual discipline in his university or a shaping
force in his social existence.”).
20. See STAVER, supra note 19, at 19–20.
21. Id. at 19 (citing Paul Blanshard, Three Cheers for Our Secular State, HUMANIST,
Mar./Apr. 1976, at 17).
22. William A. Galston, Public Morality and Religion in the Liberal State, 19 POL. SCI. &
POL. 807, 807 (1986).
23. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 31 (1998) ( “Separationism is not neutral as to either political theory (the
nature and role of the state) or ecclesiology (the nature and role of the church).”).
24. “[W]hen unmodified by other principles, separationism leads to the quiet advancement of
majoritarian bias: by separating religion from the public sphere, it perpetuates, indeed strengthens,
the civil religion within that sphere.” Developments in the Law—Religion and the State, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1606, 1636–37 (1987) [hereinafter Religion and the State]; see also Esbeck, supra note 23,
at 107 (“A separation of government from all that is religion or religious would result in a secular
public square, one hostile to the public face of religion. The Founders intended no such regime.”).
25. See, e.g., infra Part II.A.1.
26. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (maintaining
that the aim of the Establishment Clause is not simply to prohibit establishing a national church, but
to forbid any state action respecting religious establishment); Shahin Rezai, Note, County of
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support an “accommodationist” approach that allows church-state
interface as long as it does not interfere with a citizen’s freedom of
religious exercise. 27 In addition, courts have also disagreed whether the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are interrelated or mutually
exclusive, at times treating the Religion Clauses as different sides of the
same coin (“unification”), 28 and at others viewing the Clauses as
universally irreconcilable (“disassociation”). 29 Finally, courts are
divided regarding the ultimate purpose of the Religion Clauses, some
arguing that both Clauses are meant to preserve individual rights 30
(“rights-based” interpretation), others noting that the Free Exercise
Clause secures individual rights, but that the Establishment Clause
structurally restrains governmental power (“structural” interpretation). 31
Such doctrinal disputes have produced a chaotic array of
Establishment rulings. 32 As a result of the Establishment Clause
doctrinal discord, courts have held that a courtroom poster of the Ten
Commandments violates the Establishment Clause, 33 but a Ten
Commandments monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds does
not; 34 a religious message delivered by a student at graduation is
permissible, 35 but a student-led invocation at graduation does not pass

Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503,
508 (1990).
27. See Rezai, supra note 26, at 513.
28. See generally id.; see also David G. Leitch, Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by
Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127 (1985); Religion and the State, supra note 24.
29. See Rezai, supra note 26, at 508.
30. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 2.
31. Id.
32. Professor Gedicks notes,
The Court’s decisions in this area have been described as “ad hoc,” “eccentric,”
“misleading and distorting,” “historically unjustified and textually incoherent,” and—
finally— “riven by contradiction and bogged down in slogans and metaphors. . . . Steven
Smith has observed that “in a rare and remarkable way, the Supreme Court’s
establishment clause jurisprudence has unified critical opinion: people who disagree
about nearly everything else in the law agree that establishment clause doctrine is
seriously, perhaps distinctively, defective.”
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1995) (citations omitted).
33. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
34. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
35. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 250 F.3d 1330, 1342 (11th Cir. 2001) (allowing a
graduating student elected by her class to deliver an unrestricted message of her choice at
graduation).
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muster; 36 a crèche on government property is unconstitutional, but the
Jewish menorah displayed with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting
liberty is admissible; 37 and prayer is prohibited in the classroom, 38 but
permitted in the Legislature. 39
In addition to the above-named Establishment Clause issues,
twentieth-century Religion Clause interpretations raise another dilemma:
under current readings, courts consistently fail to address free exercise
considerations in an Establishment Clause context so that the Free
Exercise Clause has become little more than an “empty textual platitude”
in an Establishment Clause context. 40 This trend is particularly apparent
under a separationist interpretation of the Religion Clauses 41 since an
application of the Establishment Clause that demands complete
separation of God from the state ultimately produces a secular mindset 42
that inhibits free exercise by discriminating against nonsecular faiths. 43
The free exercise dilemma also surfaces under a “disassociated” reading
of the Religion Clauses, 44 where the dependent and equivocal nature of
the Free Exercise Clause causes it to be overlooked wherever
Establishment Clause interests are raised. 45 A “rights-based”
interpretation of the Establishment Clause additionally fetters free
exercise considerations since under such an understanding the clauses are
interpreted as mutually exclusive and fundamentally conflicting, 46 thus
precluding a free exercise analysis in an establishment context.
This Comment addresses these and other problems raised under
current
Establishment
Clause
tests,
focusing
on
the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000).
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–60 (1985).
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Beerworth, supra note 17, at 337.
See infra notes 167–74 and accompanying text.
See generally PAUL J. TOSCANO, SECULARISM, NEUTRALITY AND THE SUPREME COURT:
INVISIBLE RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15–16 (1990).
43. “[W]hen unmodified by other principles, separationism leads to the quiet advancement of
majoritarian bias: by separating religion from the public sphere, it perpetuates, indeed strengthens,
the civil religion within that sphere.” See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1636–37.
44. See infra notes 209–26 and accompanying text.
45. See Beerworth, supra note 17, at 335 (noting that the Free Exercise Clause is often
overlooked since it lacks self-contained and absolutist language and is thus subject to any constraints
emanating from the Establishment Clause); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)
(“The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede
the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”).
46. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 11–12.

216

5DEVERICH.FIN.DOC

211]

5/12/2006 12:54:57 PM

A Structural Unitary-Accommodationist Argument

accommodationist/separationist, unitary/disassociation, and rightsbased/structural interpretive debates. It ultimately concludes that a
structural unitary-accommodative approach to the Establishment Clause
may prove the optimal route to secure free exercise rights within an
establishment context. To this end, Section II analyzes the historical
trends of Establishment doctrine, concentrating on (1) the separationist
versus accommodationist understanding of the Establishment Clause, (2)
the disassociated versus unitary usage of the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, and (3) the rights-based versus structural interpretation
of the Establishment Clause. Section III considers the weaknesses and
strengths of these conflicting interpretations, examining Establishment
Clause readings that prompt the removal of free exercise considerations
in an establishment discourse. Section IV proposes a new Establishment
Clause test, which attempts to resolve the free exercise dilemma by
adopting a structural unitary-accommodationist approach to the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Finally, Section V will apply
the proposed structural unitary-accommodationist test to a series of
hypothetical Religion Clause cases and hypothesize on the future of
religious symbol jurisprudence in the courts.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF ESTABLISHMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Religious liberty has been described as America’s first freedom—the
cornerstone of our political foundation and the privilege that prompted
our Pilgrim forefathers to cross the sea. 47 Yet it also constitutes a hotly
contested constitutional right—one that has at times alienated both
believers and nonbelievers and divided the courts. It is unlikely the
Founders envisioned the divisiveness that would erupt over the religious
clauses, for their origin is a surprisingly innocuous one. 48
A. The First Amendment: An Establishment
and Free Exercise Clause Genesis
In 1789, James Madison submitted ten proposed amendments to the
recently ratified Constitution, the first of which addressed the

47. Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1243, 1243 (“[T]he Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause are the first clauses of
our First Amendment, making them our ‘first freedoms.’”).
48. THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE
PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 194 (1986) (“Americans in 1789 largely believed that issues of
Church and State had been satisfactorily settled by the individual states.”).
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coexistence of religion and the state. The draft of that Religion Clause
read, “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious
belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed.” 49 The House and Senate modified the passage
several times before both houses passed it into law, with the final clause
reading, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 50
The first sentence of the amendment allows for multiple
interpretations, and its pliancy plays a major role in the religious clause
debate today. Three Religion Clause interpretive trends are particularly
pertinent in this debate: (1) the separationist versus accommodationist
understanding of the Establishment doctrine, (2) the disassociated versus
unitary usage of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and (3) the
rights-based versus structural interpretations of the Religion Clauses.
1. Separationism versus accommodationism
The breadth of the Establishment Clause is a central issue in the
ongoing Religion Clause debate. The clause’s terminology does not
clearly indicate what the Founders 51 meant to prohibit when they barred
the “establishment of religion.” The original wording of James
Madison’s draft of the First Amendment suggests that the “establishment
of religion” doesn’t necessitate complete separation of church and state
but rather prohibits the preferential treatment by the federal government
to any one religion. 52
Similar to Madison’s version of the amendment, early drafting
reports of the clause also support an interpretation promoting the
inclusion, not expulsion, of God in the state. For example, one
congressman strongly opposed shortening the original draft of the
Establishment Clause, fearing that the abridged version—included in our

49. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 75 (1986).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. Importantly, the Founders were by no means a homogenous body with a single
disposition. So often we seek the Founders’ “original intent,” but it is highly unlikely that the
Framers saw the number of meanings in the highly pliant Amendment that we see today, leaving us
to wonder which interpretation captures the Founders’ actual motives and intent.
52. See GEDICKS, supra note 32, at 14. The aversion to the state-support of a single religion
relates, most likely, to the Founders’ aversion to the Church of England, which was a “national
religion.” Id.
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Constitution today—“might be thought to have a tendency to abolish
religion altogether.” 53 Another member of the House expressed his
“hope[s] . . . [that] the amendment would be made in such a way as to
secure the rights of conscience and a free exercise of the rights of
religion, but not to patronize those who professed no religion at all.” 54
It is also possible that in precluding government establishment of
religion, the Framers meant only to remove the question of
establishments from the federal government while leaving matters of
religious involvement to the states. 55 Such an interpretation squares with
the fact that at least six states had government-supported churches when
the First Amendment was adopted in 1789. 56
Conversely, various House drafts of the amendment suggest that the
Establishment Clause was included not just to prohibit the congressional
establishment of a single American church but to remove congressional
involvement in religious matters generally. 57 This line of
interpretation—often termed “separationism”—advocates the complete
separation of church and state, such that any commingling between the
two is deemed a religious “establishment.” 58
a. Early trends: Jefferson’s insurmountable wall. Thomas Jefferson
did much to promote a separationist interpretation of the Establishment
Clause with his “wall of separation” letter, written to a Baptist
Association frustrated with the First Amendment’s apparent exclusion of
religion from the government. 59 In that letter, Jefferson explained that by

53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
54. TOSCANO, supra note 42, at 64.
55. GEDICKS, supra note 32, at 14; see also Esbeck, supra note 23, at 16 (arguing that the
“vertical restraint” of the Establishment Clause prevented the government from “intermeddling in a
matter that was considered the sole prerogative of each state”).
56. Z. Ryan Pahnke, Note, Originalism, Ceremonial Deism and the Pledge of Allegiance, 5
NEV. L.J. 742, 761 (2005) (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 32 (1998)). The
Establishment Clause was arguably created to prevent federal interference with these state
institutions. Id.
57. At one point during the revision process, the Establishment Clause read, “Congress shall
make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience.” LEVY, supra note 49, at 58.
58. See Harold E. Fey, An Argument for Separation, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
STATE 26, 35–36 (Dallin H. Oaks ed., 1963).
59. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). Portions of Jefferson’s letter read as
follows:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God;
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers
of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
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passing the Establishment Clause, “th[e] legislature . . . buil[t] a wall of
separation between church and State.” 60 This separation theory
ultimately advocates for a “high and impregnable” partition between
religion and the state. 61
Thomas Jefferson’s wall of separation theory was not eagerly
adopted by early America. 62 Separation “conflicted with the religious
and moral assumptions” 63 of the country and seemed an impractical
endeavor to many who viewed religion “as a fully integrated part of the
life of the nation.” 64 However, despite a strong tradition of
accommodationist church-state relations, the separationist theory found a
place in early America. On a visit to the country in the 1830s, Alexis de
Toqueville observed,
I found that [American Catholic clergy] . . . all attributed the peaceful
dominion of religion in their country mainly to the separation of church

should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between church and State.
Id. (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802)).
60. Id.
61. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
62. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 144–89 (2002) (noting the
Baptist backlash against Jefferson’s proposed separation principle and the general disregard for the
wall principle as applied to government). Hamburger comments that “notwithstanding the
enthusiasm of a few intellectuals in Europe and the brief support of one group of Baptists in Virginia
in 1783, it is difficult to find dissenting denominations or even many individuals in America prior to
1800 who clearly advocated the separation of church and state.” Id. at 64.
Although Jefferson’s separationist theory speaks to one Establishment Clause interpretation, it
is by no means all-inclusive, and does not reflect the Founders’ intentions any more than an
accommodationist theory does. Indeed, some historians argue that a strict separation of church and
state is “very different from the [intent of] the religious dissenters whose demands shaped the First
Amendment” and that the “wall of separation” imposes limits on government “far beyond” and
“contrary” to what many Americans demanded. Id. at 9, 12. Even today, a strict separationist theory
is an impractical standard, which oversimplifies the complex religious liberty discourse. See id. at
479–81; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984) (according to the decision summary,
“The concept of a ‘wall’ of separation between church and state is a useful metaphor but is not an
accurate description of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists. The Constitution
does not require complete separation of church and state . . . .”); Michael W. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1452
(1990) (“[W]hile Jefferson was one of the most advanced advocates of disestablishment, his position
on free exercise was extraordinarily restrictive for his day.”); Lisa M. Kahle, Comment, Making
“Lemon-Aid” from the Supreme Court’s Lemon: Why Current Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
Should Be Replaced by a Modified Coercion Test, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 349, 393 (2005).
63. HAMBURGER, supra note 62, at 189.
64. Id. But see Esbeck, supra note 23, at 23 (“During the nineteenth century, the progressive
opinion in state governments regarded religion as an institution that should be supported voluntarily
and thus not subject to the heavy hand of governmental involvement.”).
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and state. I do not hesitate to affirm that during my stay in America I
did not meet a single individual, of the clergy or the laity, who was not
of the same opinion on this point. 65

Such separationist theories found a following in the early nineteenth
century, surfacing as a platform issue for Republicans who sought to
remove powerful Federalist ministers from the political arena. 66
Separationism later found marginal popularity among anti-Catholic
nativists who adopted the doctrine as an expression of their
antieccleasiastical views. 67
b. Everson and the strict separationist camp. The courts did not
adopt a separationist response to the Establishment Clause until the
1940s 68 and essentially endorsed an accommodationist theory until that
point. 69 Everson v. Board of Education 70 launched the modern
Establishment Clause epoch 71 in which courts adopted a strict
separationist approach to church-state interaction by reference to
Jefferson’s formidable wall of separation. In that decision, the Supreme
Court adopted a hard-line approach to the question of whether a tax

65. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 308 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1972) (1840).
66. HAMBURGER, supra note 62, at 119–29. “Separation was an idea first introduced into
American politics by Jefferson’s allies, the Republicans, who used it to elicit popular distaste against
Federalist clergymen in their exercise of their religious freedom.” Notably, these clergymen
generated a powerful sway vote against Thomas Jefferson in the election of 1800, “inveigh[ing]
against Jefferson, often from their pulpits, excoriating his infidelity and deism.” Id. at 109–10.
67. Id. at 193–251.
68. See, e.g., Robert M. Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH
AND STATE, supra note 58, at 17 (“[A]ll was quiet along the wall until Everson v. Board of
Education.”).
69. See, e.g., Avern L. Cohn & Bryan J. Anderson, Religious Liberty in Public Life: Ten
Commandments,
Other
Displays
&
Mottoes,
(June
28,
2005),
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/rel_liberty/establishment/topic.aspx?topic=public_displays.
Cohn and Anderson note that the Supreme Court
seemed uneasy with [Jefferson’s strict separation] principle in some early cases when it
declared that the United States is a “Christian country” in Vidal, and a “Christian nation”
in the 1892 decision Church of Holy Trinity v. United States. The Supreme Court of
South Dakota as late as 1929 declared this a “Christian nation” and Christianity the
“national religion” in the case State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman.
Id.
70. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that under the Establishment Clause no tax in any amount
“can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions”).
71. Kevin Pybas, Does the Establishment Clause Require Religion To Be Confined to the
Private Sphere?, EXPRESSO PREPRINT SERIES, April 6, 2005, at 3, http://law.bepress.com/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2865&context=expresso.
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could be levied to support religious activities or institutions. 72 Although
the Court ruled that the law in question—a transportation reimbursement
to parents who sent their children to either public or parochial school—
did not violate Establishment Clause standards, it is clear that the Court
wished to extend the separationist doctrine beyond the scope of the
ruling. 73 In an oft-quoted portion of that decision, the Court declared that
“[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach.” 74
The Everson Court’s benchmark separationist methodology was used
often in the mid-twentieth century to “justify encroachments on religious
practice . . . cloaked in the guise of some non-religious purpose.” 75 In
seeking to erect Jefferson’s wall of separation, the Court adopted an
establishment policy that regarded the Establishment Clause as a rigid
partition between church and state. As explained by one legal
commentator, the result of such a policy is that “where government
increases, religion must decrease . . . [and that] government and religion
mix like oil and water, that where government treads, religion must
flee.” 76
c. Warren’s neutrality retreat. Although courts applied the wall of
separation approach for decades after the Everson decision, 77 it did not
last long as the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause standard. This
could be attributed to the fact that Everson’s approach failed to deal
adequately with the social reality of church-state interaction. 78 This
72. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (“No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion.”).
73. See Beerworth, supra note 17, at 335 (“The Court’s actual holding in Everson belied its
unabashed yearning for a sprawling and historically grounded separationist doctrine.”).
74. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
75. William A. Carroll, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion, 61 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 657, 661 (1967) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
76. STAVER, supra note 19, at 19.
77. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (“[P]rayer in [the] public school
system breaches the constitutional wall of separation between Church and State.”); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1968) (holding an Arkansas statute that prevented a teacher from
explaining the theory of evolution to her students was unconstitutional based on the First
Amendment because it violated Jefferson’s “wall of separation”).
78. See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1636 (“Separationism . . . has proven to be
unadministrable in the post-New Deal era. It asks the government to cede control over realms in
which it has built up elaborate regulations in the modern welfare state.”); Pahnke, supra note 56, at
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failure prompted a shift from strict separationism to “purposive and
substantive neutrality.” 79
The Establishment Clause neutrality approach—implemented by the
Warren Court—purged governmental polices that “formally or
functionally inhibited religion.” 80 The approach was adopted on two
levels: intent and neutrality. Purposive neutrality necessitated that the
government’s intent or purpose reflect a secular or nonreligious
motivation. 81 Substantive neutrality examined the actual effect of the
government’s actions, rejecting such actions that inhibited or advanced
religion. 82 To some degree, these neutrality approaches contemplated the
inevitability of church-state interactions, thereby easing burdens on
religious activity. 83 Such establishment constructions signaled a notable
shift away from the unreasonably strict separationist doctrine. 84
d. The modern tests: Lemon, endorsement, and coercion standards.
The modern era’s separationist approach to church and state relaxed as
the courts adopted neutrality policies that addressed the intent of churchstate interactions and the actual effect of such collaborations. The courts
developed three benchmark Establishment Clause tests reflecting the
neutrality stance that has influenced much of modern Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.
The Burger Court introduced the first of these tests, adopting both
purposive and substantive neutrality principles in a hallmark
Establishment case, Lemon v. Kurtzman. 85 In that decision, the Court
outlined a three-step analysis for determining the constitutionality of
disputed church-state interaction. For the contested symbol or activity to

762 (“[The wall of separation’s] simplicity has caused an increasing number of Americans to forget
that there have been, and are meant to be, numerous connections between religion and
government.”).
79. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 335 (citing Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 335 n.17; see also Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (holding that a
New York statute that provided free textbooks to schoolchildren in public and parochial schools
without differentiation did not either advance or inhibit religion, because “[t]he express purpose of
[the statute] was . . . the furtherance of the educational opportunities for the young”).
82. See Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (holding also that the New York statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause because its effect did not advance or inhibit religion); Beerworth, supra note
17, at 335 n.17.
83. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 335–36.
84. Id.
85. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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meet Establishment Clause standards, it (1) must have a secular purpose,
(2) must have a principal or primary effect that does not advance or
inhibit religion, and (3) cannot foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion. 86
A decade later, the Rehnquist Court formulated a second test that
similarly espoused purposive and substantive neutrality standards. In her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 87 Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor outlined two areas in which government-state interactions
constituted a violation of Establishment standards: (1) when the churchstate action constitutes “excessive entanglement with religious
institutions” and (2) when the church-state interaction endorses or
disapproves of religion. 88 The “endorsement” test applies a “reasonable
observer” standard when determining whether or not “the [religious]
expression . . . indicat[es] state endorsement.” 89
Lastly, in 1992 the Rehnquist Court added a final test to its
Establishment Clause constellation, reviewing state-church interactions
by a “coercion” yardstick. 90 Justice Kennedy advanced a coercion test in
the majority opinion for Lee v. Weisman, holding that a prayer offered at
a middle school graduation could be seen by school children as “an
attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious
orthodoxy.” 91 Unlike the endorsement test, the coercion analysis did not
apply a “reasonable observer” standard, opting to avoid the “risk of
indirect coercion” by applying the coercion examination to the at-risk
group: young students in a public school context. 92 In essence, the
coercion test medially reflects a substantive approach to the
Establishment Clause since the test does not analyze the actual effect of

86. Id. at 612–13 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243 (1968)) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n., 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
87. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (finding that a city Christmas display including a nativity scene did
not violate the Establishment Clause).
88. 465 U.S. at 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor noted, “Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of
the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.” Id. at 688.
89. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 784 (1995) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
90. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (invalidating a public school district’s
practice of inviting a religious figure to deliver a nonsectarian invocation during the middle school
graduation ceremony).
91. Id. at 592.
92. Id. at 592–98.
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state-church interaction but instead examines the potential effect of such
collaboration.
The modern tests—Lemon, endorsement, and coercion—constitute
standards that have governed a majority of the Court’s modern
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In recent years, the Rehnquist Court
has employed these tests—particularly Lemon—to further an
accommodationist gloss on the neutrality doctrine, focusing heavily on
the substantive aspects of an Establishment Clause analysis. 93 On a
fundamental level, Justice Rehnquist’s stance tacitly subscribes to an
understanding of the Establishment Clause that at least partially mirrors
Madison’s initial draft of the First Amendment, suggesting that the
clause was meant to prevent the formation of a national church, or at
most bar the national preference of one religion over another. 94 In
Wallace v. Jaffree, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion argued
that the Establishment Clause merely “forbade establishment of a
national religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or
denominations.” 95 Rehnquist’s approach to Establishment jurisprudence
moves far from the strict separation of the Court, in some ways
endorsing a de facto accommodationist approach to church-state
relations. 96
e. Ceremonial deism and the revived separation of church and state.
Current trends in Establishment Clause jurisprudence have moved the
Establishment analysis to a historical examination of church-state
interaction and its role in the nation’s heritage. 97 This analysis, termed
“ceremonial deism,” 98 identifies historically significant religious
93. See Beerworth, supra note 17, at 336. See also, for example, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist enunciates the
nonpreferentialist position as forbidding “preference among religious sects or denominations.” Id.
Such a stance would allow government to aid religion on a non-discriminatory basis.
94. See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
95. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984) (“A significant example of the contemporaneous understanding of [the
Establishment] Clause is . . . [that in] the very week that Congress approved the Establishment
Clause . . . it enacted legislation providing for paid Chaplains for the House and Senate.”).
96. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld a facially neutral school voucher program
consisting of substantial aid transfers to overwhelmingly religious school coffers. 536 U.S. 639
(2002).
97. The “ceremonial deism” approach is applied mainly as a gloss to modern Establishment
Clause trends and thus coexists with the three aforementioned Establishment Clause tests.
98. “The phrase, ‘ceremonial deism,’ was coined by former Yale Law School Dean Walter
Rostow in a 1962 lecture delivered at Brown University.” Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the
Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2091 (1996). Since Rostow’s
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practices as a “class of public activity, which . . . [could] be accepted as
so conventional and uncontroversial as to be constitutional.” 99 The
ceremonial deist doctrine is a serious contender with substantive
neutrality in cases defending the constitutionality of religious tokens
such as the national motto, 100 legislative prayer, 101 religious holiday
displays, 102 the Ten Commandments, 103 and the Pledge of
Allegiance. 104
In a 1970 case, Aronow v. United States, 105 the Ninth Circuit
deemed the national motto, “In God We Trust,” compatible with the
Establishment Clause, finding that “[i]t is quite obvious that the national
motto and the slogan on coinage and currency ‘In God We Trust’ has
nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion. . . . [I]t is
excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto has no
theological or ritualistic impact.” 106 The Supreme Court decision Marsh
v. Chambers 107 likewise held that a government-endorsed religious
token—in this case a legislative session prayer—was constitutional
because it only amounted to “ceremonial practices” and was not at its
core religious. 108
One year later, the Court held in Lynch v. Donnelly that a city’s
display of a Christmas crèche did not violate the Establishment Clause
due to the display’s “historical origins of this traditional event long
recognized as a National holiday.” 109 Though Justice Brennan
questioned the constitutionality of the Lynch decision, he noted that
religious symbols like the Pledge, the national motto, and Thanksgiving
are “uniquely suited to serve such wholly secular purposes as
identification of the trend, the term has been used by the courts to describe the historical justification
for religious symbols or practices. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 603–04
(1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. Arthur E. Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G.
KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963)).
100. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970).
101. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
102. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620.
103. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005).
104. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 524 U.S. 1, 14–36 (2004).
105. 432 F.2d at 242.
106. Id. at 243–44.
107. 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (finding that the practice of opening the Nebraska Legislature with a
prayer offered by a state-chosen chaplain did not violate Establishment Clause standards).
108. Id. at 815 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE FREEDOM
170 (rev. ed. 1967)).
109. 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
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solemnizing public occasions, or inspiring commitment to meet some
national challenge in a manner that simply could not be fully served in
our culture if government were limited to purely nonreligious
phrases.” 110 Such symbols are vestiges of our religious past, he argued,
and are “probably necessary to serve certain secular functions, and that
necessity, coupled with their long history, gives those practices an
essentially secular meaning.” 111 Most recently, the Supreme Court
upheld the display of a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds
of the Texas state capitol since “[m]embers of th[e] Court have
concluded that the term or symbol at issue has no religious meaning by
virtue of its ubiquity or rote ceremonial invocation.” 112
Fundamentally, Aronow, Marsh, Lynch, and other “ceremonial deist”
rulings 113 advocate the notion that religious practices and symbols may
pass Establishment Clause muster due to historic precedence and secular
context. 114 Such a view bypasses traditional Establishment Clause tests,
proving that history can be “a vehicle for altering the religiousness of
certain practices and symbols.” 115
2. Unification versus disassociation: the bifurcation of the religion
clauses
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is additionally divided regarding
whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were intended as a
single passage to be interpreted in tandem or whether the Founders
meant the clauses to be interpreted separately. As has been noted by

110. Id. at 716–17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 717.
112. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2866 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 37 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Freethought
Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the display of a Ten
Commandments plaque outside a county courthouse did not violate the Establishment Clause
because that religious symbol, “when viewed in the context of its history, is not ‘real threat,’ but is
instead [a] ‘mere shadow’” (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring))).
113. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 630–31 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that ceremonial references to God are permissible because of their nonsectarian
nature and their long-standing existence along with the fact that they are “generally understood as a
celebration of patriotic values rather than particular religious beliefs”).
114. Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 587 (1998) (explaining that the
Court analyzes history not only for original intent, but also for its perspective on the religious nature
of symbols and practices).
115. Pahnke, supra note 56, at 760 (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983)).
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Supreme Court justices, under certain circumstances the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses are at odds with one another, one clause
tugging toward limitation of religious exercise and the other pulling
toward expansion of exercise rights. 116 The Establishment Clause, which
requires that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion,” 117 seems to engender “government discrimination against
religion,” 118 while the Free Exercise Clause, which commands that
“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion],” 119 “singles out religion for favorable treatment.” 120 Thus, in
principle, the Establishment Clause forbids the accommodative churchstate interaction that the Free Exercise Clause demands. 121
The Supreme Court recognizes this paradox, noting that it “has
struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both
of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.” 122 Justice
O’Connor describes the dilemma as one of application:
On the one hand, a rigid application of [the Establishment Clause]
would invalidate legislation exempting religious observers from
generally applicable government obligations. . . . On the other hand,
judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free
exercise of religion would completely vitiate the Establishment
Clause. 123

Despite the conceptual differences between the establishment and
free exercise doctrines, the Clauses are not wholly contradictory. 124
Justice O’Connor has noted that “[a]lthough a distinct jurisprudence has
enveloped each of [the Religion] Clauses, their common purpose is to
secure religious liberty.” 125 A possible solution to the disparate interests
116. See, e.g., Schempp, 374 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted,
“[W]hile in many contexts the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause fully complement
each other, there are areas in which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to
irreconcilable conflict with the Free Exercise Clause.” Id.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
118. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 334.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
120. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 334.
121. Id. at 335.
122. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970).
123. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 82 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2001) (identifying a shared goal
of the religious clauses “to protect religious liberty”).
125. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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of the Religious Clauses is to synthesize the Clauses in practice,
interpreting the Clauses based on their shared interest in “religious
liberty.” 126
There are two fundamental ways to approach the apparent conflict
between the Religion Clauses: (1) a “bifurcated” approach that advocates
treating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses as separate rights,
which are to be considered in independent spheres; 127 and (2) a “unitary”
interpretation that recognizes the competing interests of the Clauses but
seeks to unite the rights through a synoptic reading of the Clauses based
on their shared interest: religious liberty. 128
a. Unitary/disassociation trends. It is difficult to distinguish an early
trend in the treatment of the Free Exercise Clause in an establishment
context
since
the
Establishment
Clause
was
“basically
. . . dormant from its inception until the 1940s when the Supreme Court
said that it should be ‘incorporated’ into the Fourteenth Amendment
making it applicable against the states.” 129 However, modern courts have
tended to separate both clauses in practice, so that there are definitive
categories of “Establishment Clause cases” and “Free Exercise cases.” 130
126. Id. Professor Mary Glendon advocates the view that the Religion Clauses do not contain
contradictory principles but rather the single and fundamental command of religious liberty. She thus
“depart[s] from the standard practice of referring to that amendment’s religion language as
containing two clauses,” instead treating the First Amendment “as containing a single, coherent
Religion Clause whose establishment and free exercise provisions are both in the service of the same
fundamental value: religious freedom.” Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free
Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 478 n.8 (1991).
127. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 828–29 (1978). Professor
Tribe argues that a bifurcated approach to the clauses would prevent the Establishment Clause from
forbidding “‘legislation whose purpose or effect is to advance human dignity, equality, national
destiny, freedom, enlightenment, and morality[,]’ . . . especially if the legislation was the result of
pressure by church or religious groups.” Id. at 831 (quoting Marc Galanter, Religious Freedom in the
United States: A Turning Point?, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 217, 266).
128. “Commentators have proposed strategies of . . . unification to reconcile the apparently
growing conflict between the clauses. . . . Strategies of unification strike more deeply at the current
doctrinal conflict. They propose, with varying degrees of persuasiveness, principles whose pursuit
would effect a synoptic reading of the clauses.” Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1634–35;
see also Phillip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 839, 860 (1986) (indicating unitary direction of First Amendment toward individual
freedom).
129. Pahnke, supra note 56, at 760 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940)); see also Esbeck supra note 23, at 24 (“[T]he national-level restraint in the [Establishment]
Clause was rarely brought into contention during the first half of this century.”).
130. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 674–75 (1980) (“[T]he Court’s separate tests for the Religion
Clauses have provided virtually no guidance for determining when an accommodation for religion,
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b. Modern bifurcation and the association/separation paradox.
Notably, advocates of the separationist doctrine have tended to oppose a
disassociated treatment of the Religion Clauses. 131 Landmark
separationist decision, Everson v. Board of Education, emphasized the
complimentary nature of the Religion Clauses, and the Court observed
that both establishment and free exercise rights protect the government
from religious institutions and preserve religious liberty. 132 Separationist
ruling, Abington School District v. Schempp, 133 similarly advocated a
unitary understanding of the Religion Clauses, most notably in Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion, which states, “The inclusion of
[establishment and free exercise] restraints . . . shows unmistakably that
the Framers of the First Amendment were not content to rest the
protection of religious liberty exclusively upon either clause.” 134 As will
be discussed shortly, this unitary understanding of the Religion Clauses
does much to foster the religious liberty at the heart of the Clauses. 135
While separationists generally support a unitary reading of
establishment and free exercise rights, accommodationists tend to adopt a
disassociated approach to the Religion Clauses. 136 In Lee v. Weisman,

seemingly required under the Free Exercise Clause, constitutes impermissible aid to religion under
the Establishment Clause.”); Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment
Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817, 821–22 (1984) (noting that judges and commentators view
the Religion Clauses as contradictory and tend to separate issues into one or the other category);
Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1633–34 (“As a result of the Court’s differing standards, the
outcome of cases may often depend on whether a particular dispute is characterized as an
establishment or a free exercise claim.”).
131. See Rezai, supra note 26, at 508 (noting that strict separationists generally maintain that
the Religion Clauses must be read together).
132. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); see also id. at 40 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (indicating that the Religion Clauses’ interdependent ideas represent different facets of
same general principle). But see Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“Although [the Religion
Clauses] may in certain instances overlap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental
encroachment upon religious freedom.”).
133. 374 U.S. 203, 219–20 (1963) (quoting Zorach v. Clawson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952)
(“[T]he First Amendment reflects the philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so
far as interference with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ of religion are
concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal.”).
134. 374 U.S. 203, 232–33 (Brennan, J., concurring).
135. See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1635 (“Strategies of unification strike more
deeply at the current doctrinal conflict.”).
136. See Rezai, supra note 26, at 511 (“Accommodationists argue that there is an inherent
tension between the free exercise and establishment clauses and that if each were taken to its logical
conclusion they will inevitably clash.”); Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1631 (“Both the
Supreme Court and commentators currently perceive Religion Clause doctrine as a bipolar
conflict.”); Leitch, supra note 28, at 132–33 (asserting that in light of the perceived conflict between
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the Court points to such a bifurcated methodology, noting that “[t]he
principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion
does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the
Establishment Clause.” 137 Walz v. Tax Commission similarly indicates
accommodationist courts’ disassociated view that “the [Religion
Clauses] are cast in absolute terms, and either[,] . . . if expanded to a
logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.” 138
As will be discussed in the next section, free exercise rights are at
particular risk under a bifurcated system since the Establishment Clause,
historically and by nature, is the more controlling of the two clauses. 139
Thus, disassociated readings of the clauses tend to focus exclusively on
Establishment Clause considerations even when free exercise issues are
present. 140 In this way, the disassociated approach to the Religion
Clauses may actually contradict accommodationists’ goal: to “respec[t]
the religious nature of [the] people and accommodat[e] the public service
to their spiritual needs.” 141
3. Rights-based versus structural objectives: the intended aim of the
Establishment Clause
A final question that arises in the context of the Religion Clauses is
whether the clauses are rights-based so that they both aim to preserve
individual liberties, or whether the Free Exercise Clause is rights-based
and the Establishment Clause is merely structural in the sense that it
primarily monitors governmental influence in the religious arena. The
unitary/disassociation debate stems in part from this final interpretive
dispute. Fundamentally, a rights-based interpretation of both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses invokes the conflict at the heart of

underlying principles of the Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court abandoned a strict separation
doctrine).
137. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
138. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 82–83 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (justifying a separate and more flexible
Establishment Clause analysis when Establishment rights conflict with the Free Exercise Clause);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 811 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the conflicts that
exist between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).
139. See infra notes 220–30 and accompanying text.
140. “The Establishment Clause has been the enduring focal point of judicial tinkering in
matters of religion; free exercise has ever been an unattractive afterthought. As long as this myopia
persists, sound doctrinal answers to the more complex Religion Clause questions will remain
extremely difficult to come by.” Beerworth, supra note 17, at 338.
141. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
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the bifurcation argument. 142 If the Establishment Clause is viewed as
securing an individual’s freedom from religion and the Free Exercise
Clause as safeguarding the right to exercise religion, the clauses
inevitably collide. 143 Conversely, some legal scholars have argued that a
rights-based understanding of the Free Exercise Clause and a structuralist
interpretation of the Establishment Clause tend to reconcile perceived
tension between the clauses. 144
From its inception, the Establishment Clause has been burdened with
conflicting rights-based and structural interpretations. 145 Carl H. Esbeck
noted that nineteenth-century state-law interpretations of the
Establishment Clause were based on “notions of individual freedom and
equality among sects.” 146
The Supreme Court upheld a similar rights-based interpretation in
Larson v. Valente, 147 where the Court invoked the Establishment Clause
to strike down state charitable solicitation legislation that favored
religious groups with substantial member-revenue, thus discriminating
against newly formed religious sects. 148 The Court concluded that the
preference of any religious denomination “violate[d] the Establishment
Clause.” 149 For the most part, however, twentieth-century courts have
favored a structural interpretation that views the Establishment Clause
not as a rights-based protection but as a structurally limiting device that
demarcates governmental and religious spheres. 150 As will be discussed
in the next section, such a structural view is fundamental to a cohesive
relationship between the Religion Clauses. 151
The rights-based/structuralist debate is an interesting one, especially
in light of certain inconsistencies in the Court’s treatment of the

142. See supra notes 116–28 and accompanying text.
143. Esbeck, supra note 23, at 12.
144. This argument is dealt with later in this Comment. See infra notes 246–48 and
accompanying text.
145. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 21 (“[F]rom its inception the Establishment Clause
. . . had the role of a structural clause rather than a rights-based clause.”).
146. Id. at 23.
147. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
148. Id. at 247 n.23.
149. Id. at 255.
150. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 4 (“Since Everson, the Court has sub silentio given the
Establishment Clause a far different application than if its object were to guarantee individual
religious rights.”).
151. See infra notes 240–45 and accompanying text.
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question. 152 An example of such inconsistency is evidenced in the
Court’s approach towards standing issues in the Religion Clause context.
Typically, claimants seeking redress from the court must have suffered a
personal, concrete injury that can be rectified in a judicial setting. 153
Under a structural interpretation, however, the Court has applied a less
rigorous standard, thereby allowing persons to assert Establishment
Clause claims as federal taxpayers, 154 to assert violations for religious
symbols on government property, 155 and to allege endorsement of
religion in a manner violative of the Clause 156 even without specific
injury. 157 This differs from rights-based free exercise claims where the
Court requires individualized and concrete injury. 158
The Court’s dual standing policy may be based on the idea that under
a structural doctrine, personal constitutional rights are not at stake, but
instead constitutional limitations on the reach of governmental power. 159
Thus, while the rights-based Free Exercise Clause protects individual
exercise of religion, the structurally based Establishment Clause sets
checks on the reach of government within the religious sphere. These
“checks must be honored whether or not [an] individual . . . suffer[s a]
concrete ‘injury in fact.’” 160

152. Esbeck, supra note 23, at 33. See also id. at 33–60 for a discussion of other rights-based
versus structuralist disparities seen in the Court’s treatment of class-wide remedies, church
autonomy, and the nondelegation rule.
153. Id. at 33 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (holding that standing requires
that plaintiffs allege some personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants’ alleged conduct and
seek a remedy that is judicially cognizable)).
154. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
155. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778–82 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Suhre v. Haywood County, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086–88 (4th Cir.
1997).
156. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S.
1201 (1996); see also Esbeck, supra note 23, at 37–38 (noting that even the Everson Court allowed a
taxpayer to pursue an Establishment claim without any discussion of standing).
157. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 35–40.
158. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & St., 454 U.S.
464, 485–86 (1982) (holding that the violation of the Free Exercise Clause without identification of
personalized injury suffered as a consequence of the constitutional error does not provide injury
sufficient to confer standing under Article III).
159. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 39.
160. Id. at 104.
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III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATIONS
AND THE FREE EXERCISE DILEMMA
Clearly, there is much confusion concerning which interpretive
approach best achieves the aims of the Religion Clauses. 161 This Part
analyzes arguments for and against separationist and accommodationist
readings of the Establishment Clause, unitary and bifurcated treatments
of the Religion Clauses, and rights-based and structural applications. In
addition, it addresses potential religious freedom concerns raised under
current Establishment Clause tests, concluding that a unitaryaccommodative approach may prove the optimal route to secure free
exercise rights within an establishment context.
A. Separationism, Accommodationism, and the Free Exercise Dilemma
There has been little consensus on whether the Religion Clauses
dictate an accommodationist or separationist approach. 162 Generally,
historical movements indicate a shift from early accommodationist
trends, 163 to a strict separationist stance, 164 back to a “flexible” 165
accommodationist interpretation 166 of the Establishment Clause doctrine.
Some scholars—and even some courts—argue for a strict
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 167 Such
separationists view the clause as precluding any interaction between
religion and the government, 168 including any aid to religion, be it direct
or indirect. 169 Ultimately, separationists maintain that a strict
161. See Cohn & Anderson, supra note 69 (maintaining that recent Supreme Court decisions
demonstrate little consensus over what approach to apply when evaluating the constitutionality of
potential Establishment Clause violations).
162. See id.
163. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text.
165. See Rezai, supra note 26, at 521–26.
166. See supra notes 77–96 and accompanying text.
167. See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 28–74 (Rutledge, J., dissenting);
David R. Dow, Toward a Theory of the Establishment Clause, 56 UMKC L. REV. 491 (1988)
(maintaining that strict neutrality is a fundamental concept of the Establishment Clause); Steve Gey,
Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment
Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1981).
168. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 31–32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The Amendment was broadly
but not loosely phrased. . . . [T]he object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and
civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.”).
169. See id. at 33 (finding that the Establishment Clause prohibits any state support of
religion); see also Rezai, supra note 26, at 507–09.
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separationist view of the Establishment Clause, or the “wall of
separation” doctrine, corresponds with the Framers’ intent. 170 In Everson
v. Board of Education, the Court held that the Establishment Clause
precluded interaction between church and state, all governmental aid to
religion, and any government participation in religious affairs. 171 As
explained by the Court, “In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between church and State.’” 172 Justice Brennan’s dissent in
Lynch v. Donnelly expresses the view that the Establishment Clause
reserves the “promoti[on]” of religious beliefs strictly to “churches,
religious institutions, and spiritual leaders.” 173 The Court similarly noted
in Aguilar v. Felton that to best serve its purpose, religion must be left
entirely free within its “respective sphere.” 174
Other scholars and courts have noted the complications of a
separationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 175 They remark
that logistically a strict separationist approach might be unrealistic. 176
One scholar explained, “Separationism . . . has proven to be
unadministrable in the post-New Deal era. It asks the government to cede
control over realms in which it has built up elaborate regulations in the
modern welfare state.” 177 Another commentator observed, “[The] broad
tendency [of the Constitution] to penetrate all social groups and
institutions, including religious ones, with ‘universal’ ordering principles
necessarily implies the destruction of religious consciousness.” 178
The “universal” separation of church and state advocated by
separationists might prove difficult to apply: religion is an integral part
170. See LEVY, supra note 49, at 89 (maintaining that the Religion Clauses are meant to
preclude government from legislating on subject of religion); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 18
(stating that no aid may be given to religion, while quoting Jefferson’s words that that Establishment
Clause was intended to erect a “wall between church and state”).
171. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
172. Id.
173. 465 U.S. 668, 725 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985) (quoting McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)
(“[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and government can best work to
achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere.”)).
175. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952); Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1636 (positing that separationism is both
“unworkable in practice” and “unviable in theory”).
176. See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1636.
177. Id.
178. Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A Privatization Theory of the Religion Clauses, 30
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 280 (1986).
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of American culture and history, and thus serves both secular and
religious functions. 179 In his Lynch concurrence, Justice Brennan noted,
“The practices by which the government has long acknowledged religion
are . . . probably necessary to serve certain secular functions.” 180 The
Supreme Court similarly noted,
In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200
years, there can be no doubt that the [religious] practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our
society. To invoke Divine guidance . . . is simply a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this
country. 181

Indeed, even in the landmark separationist case, Everson v. Board of
Education, a separationist doctrine proved unworkable and problematic,
thereby causing the Court to find a parochial transportation
reimbursement plan permissible—a decision that fundamentally violated
the “no aid” 182 separationist policy posited in the first half of the
opinion. 183
There are also inherent inconsistencies in a strict separationist
policy. 184 The stricter versions of separationism call for no aid to
179. See Pahnke, supra note 56, at 762 (“[The wall of separation’s] simplicity has caused an
increasing number of Americans to forget that there have been, and are meant to be, numerous
connections between religion and government.”).
180. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717 (1984).
181. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983).
182. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’
clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another.” (citation omitted)).
183. “[T]he undertones of the [Everson] opinion, advocating complete and uncompromising
separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its conclusion yielding support to their
commingling in educational matters.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 19 (Jackson, J. and Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Black’s prohibitions, applied rigorously, would forbid reimbursement, because it
would amount to a transportation subsidy for parochial schools. The general benefit
requirement, in contrast, would oppose the exclusion of parochial school students (and
their parents) from the transportation reimbursement plan because attendance at parochial
school is not a sufficient reason for exclusion.
John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV.
83, 95 n.57 (1986) (maintaining that Everson demonstrates the narrow scope of strict neutrality
doctrine).
184. See generally TRIBE, supra note 127, § 14-3, at 1167, § 14-7, at 1189 (arguing that in
view of inherent inconsistencies in strict neutrality theory—allowing subsidies to religious
institutions as long as religious classifications are not used—“it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court has rejected strict neutrality”); Kenneth Mitchell Cox, Recent Development, The Lemon Test
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religion whatsoever. 185 However, a complete separation of church and
state might at times aid religion, for example when a church is
considered beyond the scope of certain government regulations. 186
“Thus, the ‘no-aid’ view is at odds with genuine separationism, which
‘opposes involvement by the government in the affairs of religious
organizations, whether the involvement is a benefit or a burden.’” 187
Most importantly, however, a strict separationist approach to
establishment cases might hinder religious free exercise, thus inhibiting
one of the fundamental purposes of the Religion Clauses—“religious
liberty.” 188 Problematically, an application of the Establishment Clause
that demands complete separation of God from the state produces a
secular mindset, which is an orientation unto itself, ultimately
discriminating against nonsecular beliefs. 189 In this way, separationism
moves the courts far from an ideological neutrality, essentially
establishing a secular canon that acts much like a “national religion”
forbidden in Madison’s initial draft of the Establishment Clause. 190
Shortly after the Everson decision, scholar George E. Reed forecast
the consequences of the strict separationist movement, commenting,
Unless the current doctrinaire formula of separation of Church and
State is abandoned as a basis for judicial and legislative action, we may
ultimately witness the death of religious liberty and with it separation
of Church and State in the true meaning of the term, for it is
conditioned upon religious liberty. 191

Soured: The Supreme Court’s New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177–
78 (1984) (maintaining that although the Supreme Court has advocated strict neutrality policies, the
Court has never adopted it in practice).
185. See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1636.
186. Id. (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1971)).
187. Id. (citations omitted).
188. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that
“religious liberty” is the shared aim of both Religion Clauses); see also TRIBE, supra note 127, § 4–
7, at 1189 (arguing that most commentators regard the concept of strict neutrality as incompatible
with the Free Exercise Clause).
189. “[W]hen unmodified by other principles, separationism leads to the quiet advancement of
majoritarian bias: by separating religion from the public sphere, it perpetuates, indeed strengthens,
the civil religion within that sphere.” Religion and the State, supra note 24; see also Esbeck, supra
note 23, at 107 (“A separation of government from all that is religion or religious would result in a
secular public square, one hostile to the public face of religion. The Founders intended no such
regime.”).
190. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 432–33 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
191. George E. Reed, Separation of Church and State—Its Real Meaning!, CATH. ACTION,
Mar. 1949, at 10.
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In Zorach v. Clausen, the Supreme Court similarly explained that failing
to “accommodate[] the public service to . . . spiritual needs
. . . find[s] in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a
callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those
who believe in no religion over those who do believe.” 192 The Court
again commented in Lee v. Weisman that a “relentless and all-pervasive
attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself
become inconsistent with the Constitution” 193 and that not “every . . .
action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it
offensive.” 194 Fundamentally, a separationist approach to Establishment
Clause questions may enforce a secular regime that is far from neutral
and actually limits the free exercise rights that a separationist approach
avers to protect.
Accommodation, on the other hand, engenders a more neutral regime
in practice. Under an accommodationist theory, the objective of the
Establishment Clause shifts from removing all vestiges of religion from
the state to “forb[idding] establishment of a national religion, and
forb[idding] preference among religious sects or denominations.” 195
This allows the government to “respect[] the religious nature of [its]
people and accommodat[e] the public service to their spiritual needs”
without breaching the “constitutional standard [of] the separation of
Church and State.” 196
Such an interpretation of the Establishment Clause is not without
merit. 197 Indeed, First Amendment drafts, comments from various
Founders, and the church-state relations existing in early America
comport with such a view. 198 The Supreme Court upheld
192. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
193. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
194. Id. at 597.
195. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
196. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314.
197. Speaking of the erroneously applied “wall of separation” doctrine, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted,
There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to
build the ‘wall of separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson. . . . But the greatest
injury of the ‘wall’ notion is its mischievous diversion of judges from the actual
intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. . . . [N]o amount of repetition of historical
errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true. The ‘wall of separation between
church and state’ is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved
useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106–07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
198. See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
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accommodation in Lynch v. Donnelly, positing that “[the Constitution]
affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all
religions, and forbids hostility toward any.” 199 A recent Supreme Court
decision, Van Orden v. Perry, similarly maintains the accommodationist
view that religious symbols or actions “[s]imply having religious content
or promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine d[o] not run
afoul of the Establishment Clause.” 200
Ultimately, an accommodationist view recognizes the important role
that religion plays in many Americans’ lives and attempts to
accommodate those religious beliefs while concurrently respecting the
views of nonbelievers. 201 This accommodationist approach must, by
necessity, dismantle the wall of separation erected by some as a
“philosophy of hostility to religion.” 202
The problems surrounding the ceremonial deist approach to the
Establishment Clause are illustrative of the difficulties stemming from a
separationist philosophy. While the ceremonial deist approach is in many
ways accommodationist since it accommodates some level of churchstate interface, it allows such church-state interaction only if the religious
symbol or practice is deemed secular 203 or of historic value. 204 Courts
thus prescribe secular—or nonreligious—values to religious tokens that,
to many citizens, retain religious meaning. Such a practice leans more
toward a separationist approach because religion is ultimately separated
from public life in the sense that a symbol or practice is rejected unless a
court finds it “nonreligio[us].” 205
Professor Frederick Gedicks comments on this trend, noting that “the
Court has generally defended [religious] practices by reference to the
secular individualist value of neutrality between religion and nonreligion

199. 465 U.S. 668, 668 (1984).
200. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (2005).
201. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (“[W]e find no constitutional
requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its
weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”).
202. Id. at 315.
203. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 616 (1989) (“[B]oth Christmas and
Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a secular status in our
society.”).
204. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716–17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[S]uch practices as the designation
of ‘In God We Trust’ as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of
Allegiance . . . serve certain secular functions, and that necessity, coupled with their long history,
gives those practices an essentially secular meaning.”).
205. GEDICKS, supra note 32, at 63.
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rather than the religion communitarian value of encouraging socially
valuable religion.” 206 Thus, the ceremonial deist approach is potentially
more adverse to church-state interrelations than even a strict separationist
stance since it must prescribe secular or nonreligious value-sets on
feasibly religious practices. This necessarily “forces the Court into the
awkward position of arguing the secularity of activities that seem
indisputably religious.” 207 Under such a requisite, free exercise rights are
at risk since “the individual’s freedom to choose his own creed is the
counterpart of his right to refrain from accepting the creed established by
the majority.” 208
B. Unification, Disassociation, and the Free Exercise Paradox
Similar to the separationist/accommodationist debate addressed
above, there is little consensus regarding whether the Founders intended
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to be read as a unitary
passage to be employed in tandem (“unification”), or as distinct clauses
with separate purposes and legal meaning (“disassociation”). However,
given the consistency and applicability of a unification approach, not
only will a unified view of the Clauses protect religious liberty, but also
this view was likely the original intention of the Founders.
Scholars arguing for a disassociated approach to the Clauses
maintain that establishment and free exercise rights are fundamentally
contradictory. 209 To surmount the irreconcilability of the Clauses,
disassociation advocates propose methods for “maneuvering between the
clauses” 210 and determining whether a case invokes establishment or
free exercise considerations. 211 Laurence Tribe has advocated one such
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985).
209. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970) (“The Court has struggled to
find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and
either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”); George
Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519,
1563–64 (1983) (advocating a bifurcated definition of Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses’
definition of “religion”); Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1638–39 (stating that the Religion
Clauses are functionally interdependent).
210. Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1634.
211. Choper, supra note 130, at 674–75 (“[T]he Court’s separate tests for the Religion Clauses
have provided virtually no guidance for determining when an accommodation for religion,
seemingly required under the Free Exercise Clause, constitutes impermissible aid to religion under
the Establishment Clause. Nor has the Court adequately explained why aid to religion, seemingly
violative of the Establishment Clause, is not actually required by the Free Exercise Clause.”);
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strategy, proposing that courts apply different definitions of religion to
establishment and free exercise cases—a broad meaning of religion is
appropriate for cases falling under a Free Exercise Clause designation,
and narrower definitions of religion must be maintained to appropriately
deal with Establishment Clause issues. 212 George Freeman advocates a
similar definitional approach, suggesting that under an Establishment
Clause analysis “religion” is defined under a set of “paradigmatic
features,” 213 but “[u]nder the free exercise clause . . . religion must be
given its standard meaning.” 214
Other scholars have noted that such bifurcated approaches to the
Religion Clauses are troublesome, producing an “unprincipled and
inconsistent framework for Religion Clause decisions.” 215 For example,
disassociation advocates treat establishment and free exercise concerns
as separate rights that necessitate different tests yet provide little
guidance as to when an establishment versus a free exercise designation
applies. 216 Noting this problem of case “characterization,” Philip
Johnson explained,
Judges and commentators have often observed that the free exercise
and the establishment clauses look in opposite directions, so that a
direct conflict may arise if one is allowed to intrude into territory
properly belonging to the other. What is less frequently noted is that
many significant problems can be categorized so as to fall under the

Johnson, supra note 130, at 821–22 (noting that significant problems arise when the courts
“categorize” cases under either “Establishment” or “Free Exercise” labels).
212. Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1634 (citing TRIBE, supra note 127, at 826–33).
But cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1186 n.53 (2d ed. 1988)
(criticizing the two-definitions approach advocated in Tribe’s first edition).
213. Such paradigmatic religious features include “[a] belief in a Supreme Being,” “[a] belief
in a transcendent reality,” “[a] moral code,” “[a] world view that provides an account of man’s role
in the universe and around which an individual organizes his life,” “[s]acred rituals and holy days,”
“[w]orship and prayer,” “[a] sacred text or scriptures,” and “[m]embership in a social organization
that promotes a religious belief system.” Freeman, supra note 15, at 1553.
214. Id. at 1564.
215. Id.; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
(“‘Religion’ appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs two prohibitions and
governs them alike. It does not have two meanings, one narrow to forbid ‘an establishment’ and
another, much broader, for securing ‘the free exercise thereof.’”); Esbeck, supra note 23, at 7 (noting
that the “two definitions” approach is problematic since it might find an activity permissible under
the Establishment meaning of religion but impermissible under the free exercise meaning). Esbeck
also finds the definitional approach “puzzling” since “the word ‘religion’ appears only once in the
text of the First Amendment, applicable to both Clauses.” Id.
216. Choper, supra note 130, at 674–75 (stating that the Supreme Court subordinates
Establishment Clause principles in face of substantial free exercise claims).

241

5DEVERICH.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

5/12/2006 12:54:57 PM

[2006

rule of either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause,
depending upon which we would prefer to have govern the
situation. 217

As a result of accommodationists’ separate treatment of the clauses, the
outcome of a case may differ drastically based on a court’s designation
of the case as dealing with establishment issues or with free exercise
questions. 218
A bifurcated interpretation of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses also potentially inhibits the religious freedom both clauses are
meant to protect. 219 Under an approach that requires courts to divide
cases along establishment and free exercise lines, 220 free exercise is
often dragged through the mud since it lacks self-contained and
absolutist language 221 and is thus subject to any constraints emanating
from the Establishment Clause. 222 Lee v. Weisman is illustrative of this
establishment-favored approach, holding that prayer at a school
graduation ceremony is unconstitutional since “[t]he principle that
government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not
supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment
Clause.” 223 Such a ruling turns the Free Exercise Clause into little more
than an “empty textual platitude” 224 so that religious freedom rights are
at risk wherever Establishment Clause considerations are evoked. 225
Andrew Beerworth explains,

217. Johnson, supra note 130, at 821–22.
218. “As a result of the Court’s differing standards, the outcome of cases may often depend on
whether a particular dispute is characterized as an establishment or a free exercise claim.” Religion
and the State, supra note 24, at 1633–34.
219. See id. at 1634–35 (arguing that a disassociated approach to the Religion Clauses “may
obscure the underlying values the clauses are meant to protect”).
220. Esbeck, supra note 23, at 11 (“[C]ourts are increasingly confronted with supposed
‘collisions’ of the Establishment Clause with other Clauses in the First Amendment that force them
to subordinate one Clause to give the other full play.”).
221. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 335 n.14.
222. Id.; see also, Lee v. Weisman, 505 US 577, 587 (1992).
223. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
224. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 337.
225. See, for example, Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the
Supreme Court abandoned the former requirements of strict scrutiny and compelling interests in free
exercise cases involving government policy, for fear that allowing such considerations would “[risk]
a violation of the Establishment Clause by arbitrarily limiting its religious exemptions.” Id. at 916
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Such free exercise considerations were deemed a “luxury” that “we
cannot afford.” Id. at 888 (majority opinion).
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The Establishment Clause has been the enduring focal point of judicial
tinkering in matters of religion; free exercise has ever been an
unattractive afterthought. As long as this myopia persists, sound
doctrinal answers to the more complex Religion Clause questions will
remain extremely difficult to come by. 226

Thus, a disassociated reading of the Religion Clauses is problematic
since it tends to overlook free exercise considerations in an
Establishment Clause analysis.
Free exercise liberties are additionally fettered by the breadth of the
modern Establishment Clause tests. 227 Mary Ann Glendon and Raul F.
Yanes noted that “[o]nce the court had interpreted the establishment
provision so broadly as to forbid, in principle, any governmental aid to
religion, conflict with the mandate to accommodate free exercise was
inevitable.” 228 With twentieth-century courts’ lingering separationist
tendencies, “it was further almost inevitable that free exercise would be
narrowly construed to avoid conflict, for ‘accommodations’ of religious
belief and action, when viewed through separationist lenses, were hard to
distinguish
from
impermissible
assistance
to
religion.” 229
Problematically, this free exercise suppression surfaces only in cases
where the free exercise of “believers” is at stake—in cases concerning
nonbelievers, separationism and free exercise are “mutually
reinforcing.” 230
Unitary advocates offer a possible solution to the disassociation
dilemma, arguing that the Religion Clauses should not be separated but
synthesized in such a way as to promote the clauses’ shared interest in
religious liberty. 231 Such advocates note that where the Free Exercise

226. Beerworth, supra note 17, at 338.
227. Paul Toscano notes,
The Court [has] . . . shifted the syntactical force of the word ‘establishment’ from that of
a noun (‘a church or religious institution’) to that of a verb (‘to advance or aid’). . . .
Where the national government was originally committed to keeping its hands off
institutional and personal religion, it is now committed, by the United States Supreme
Court, to a policy of continual interference in the form of case-by-case line drawing, as
the courts attempt to determine which activities of government amount to a religious
preference and which to religious interference.
TOSCANO, supra note 42, at 65.
228. Glendon & Yanes, supra note 126, at 489.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 273 (4th Cir. 2001); Kurland, supra note 128, at
860 (noting the unitary direction of the Religion Clauses toward individual freedom).
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Clause protects spiritual liberty, the Establishment Clause safeguards the
environments and institutions needed to preserve that freedom. 232
To properly invoke a unitary reading of the clauses, courts would
necessarily reject the “definitional” approach to the Religion Clauses that
defines religion narrowly in an Establishment Clause context and broadly
under a Free Exercise Clause framework. 233 Thus, under a unitary
understanding, a court would focus on the shared understanding of the
clauses that “the free exercise clause protects the individual’s choice of
his identity [as to religion], and the establishment clause protects the
pluralistic structure of the background social institutions necessary to
make that choice both possible and meaningful.” 234 Under a unitary
understanding, an individual’s free exercise rights would be properly
limited only when that freedom endangers the governmental authority—
or structure—necessary to protect that exercise of autonomy. 235 In this
way, a unitary reading of the clauses is useful since it creates a system of
checks and balances between the clauses that allows neither
governmental authority nor citizens’ rights to encroach upon the other.
Such an approach would ultimately foster the religious liberty at the
heart of the Clauses. 236
C. Rights-Based Versus Structural Objectives
and the Free Exercise Counterpart
A third interpretative Religion Clause dilemma arises when
comparing the rights-based and structuralist interpretations of the
Religion Clauses. While a rights-based understanding of the
Establishment Clause might be thought to reconcile the Religion Clauses
on a definitional level, the structuralist interpretation does much to ease
the actual tension between establishment and free exercise
considerations.
The rights-based/structuralist debate is in reality a subset of the
unification/disassociation
argument:
similar
to
unification/
disassociation, it considers how the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses interact with one another. However, unlike unification/

232. See Religion and the State, supra note 24, at 1638–40.
233. See id. at 1634–35.
234. Id. at 1638 (citations omitted).
235. Id.
236. See id. at 1635 (“Strategies of unification strike more deeply at the current doctrinal
conflict.”).
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disassociation, the rights-based/structural concern is not whether the
Clauses are considered in tandem, but rather how the clauses are viewed
in application. The rights-based/structural argument focuses specifically
on the Establishment Clause and whether courts treat the clause as a
constitutional doctrine protecting individual rights or a structural
mechanism 237 that “police[s] the boundary between government and
religion.” 238
Fundamentally, a rights-based interpretation of the Establishment
Clause invokes the clause conflict at the heart of the bifurcation
argument. Carl Esbeck notes,
A major cause of this imagined ‘tension’ [between the Religion
Clauses] is the uncritical assumption that the Establishment Clause is
rights-based. If the object of that Clause really was to secure a freedom
from religion (and the Free Exercise Clause doubtlessly secures some
right to exercise religion) then of course the two Clauses would
frequently be found on a collision course. 239

A structure-based understanding of the Establishment Clause does
much to ease the supposed conflict between the clauses. 240 If the Free
Exercise Clause is viewed as protecting the individual’s right to religion
and the Establishment Clause as limiting governmental influence over
religion, then both clauses strive toward the same goal: protection of
religious liberty. This understanding squares with a unitary interpretation
in which the clauses work in tandem so that neither governmental
authority nor citizens’ rights encroach upon the other. 241
To apply a rights-based interpretation to the Free Exercise Clause
and a structural interpretation of the Establishment Clause, courts need
not do much—a rights-based/structural treatment has been nearly

237. Justice Brennan advocated a structural interpretation of the Establishment Clause, noting
the following:
Most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, even if they are not generally enforceable in
the absence of state action, nevertheless arise out of moral intuitions applicable to
individuals as well as governments. The Establishment Clause, however, is quite
different. It is, to its core, nothing less and nothing more than a statement about the
proper role of government in the society that we have shaped for ourselves in this land.
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 802 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238. Esbeck, supra note 23, at 12.
239. Id.
240. Id. (“These ‘battles of the Clauses’ would not occur if the Establishment Clause were
openly acknowledged as structural.”).
241. See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
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consistent since Everson. 242 However, courts would do well to dismiss
the two-definitional approach applied in a disassociated reading of the
Religion Clauses. 243 A single definition of religion under the rightsbased/structural argument seems counterintuitive since, as Esbeck notes,
the rights-based Free Exercise Clause must have a broad definition of
religion to protect the rights of religious nonconformists or the religious
minority, but the Establishment Clause must have a narrower, fixed
definition so as to properly manage sovereign power. 244 In this way,
Esbeck argues that the “difference in task[s] between a structural clause
and a rights clause . . . [requires] a broad, flexible definition of religion
for the Free Exercise Clause and a narrow, fixed definition for the
Establishment Clause.” 245 Others have argued that a rightsbased/structural interpretation does not necessitate two definitions of
religion. Kathleen M. Sullivan proposes that the definitional problem is
“solved not by defining ‘religion’ narrowly for establishment clause
purposes, but rather by defining narrowly what constitutes
‘establishment.’” 246 Maintaining the broader free exercise definition for
“religion” under an Establishment test might further religious liberty in
the sense that “secular religion” would be suspect under the
Establishment Clause, and rulings that limit religious practices in favor
of “secular” or “atheistic” beliefs would be limited.
Additionally, the rights-based/structural interpretation is furthered if
courts openly acknowledge the structural nature of the Establishment
Clause, 247 and employ a balancing test between the Free Exercise Clause
that protects individual rights and the Establishment Clause that limits
governmental rights. Importantly, a structural interpretation of the
government-religion boundary does not merit the complete separation of
government from all things religious. 248 If structural establishment limits
are not weighed properly against individual free exercise rights, the
242. See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 4 (“Since Everson, the Court has sub silentio given the
Establishment Clause a far different application than if its object were to guarantee individual
religious rights.”).
243. But see id. at 8–9 (arguing that a “two definition” approach necessarily follows a
structural Establishment Clause and a rights-based Free Exercise Clause).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 9.
246. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 468 (1999).
247. See Esbeck supra note 23, at 75 (“Openly applying the Establishment Clause as a
structural, rather than a rights-based, clause would bring about a shift in how judges and litigants
conceptualize problems involving government-religion relations.”).
248. Id. at 107.
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courts unwittingly endorse a kind of secular faith. This sounds a deathknell for free exercise rights, and religious citizens are thus subject to
discrimination from a culture of disbelief. The delicate balance between
establishment structural limitations and free exercise rights is lost.
IV. THE UNITARY-ACCOMMODATIONIST THEORY
In response to the establishment and free exercise dilemma outlined
above, the following discussion proposes a new structural unitaryaccommodationist test that focuses not just on the Establishment Clause
portion of the religious liberty clauses; rather, the proposed test addresses
both establishment and free exercise rights in a two-pronged framework
that considers the following: (1) whether the words “under God” endorse
or discourage a specific religion or religious belief in such a way that
violates the structural limitations of the Establishment Clause, and (2)
whether the contested symbol or governmental action prevents a
reasonable individual from projecting his religious beliefs on the symbol
or practice. Such a test would reconcile establishment doctrine with free
exercise considerations as well as resolve the Court’s trend of
secularizing religious beliefs under a ceremonial deist argument. Most
importantly, the test fulfills both ends of the religion clauses at a
fundamental level: it protects an individual’s spiritual liberty while
safeguarding the institutions essential to the preservation of that liberty.
To this end, Section A will address the first prong of the structural
unitary-accommodationist test and how it compares to modern
establishment tests. Section B will address the second prong and
similarly analyze the prong in light of current Establishment Clause
doctrine.
A. Structural Accommodation: The Establishment Threshold Prong
As discussed earlier, 249 a strictly separationist view of church-state
relations may be “unworkable in practice [and] unviable in theory.” 250
For the government to maintain the free exercise liberties guaranteed in
the Constitution, it cannot wholly separate itself from religious affairs. 251

249. See supra notes 175–94 and accompanying text.
250. See Religion and the State, supra note 24 at 1636.
251. Id.; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an
Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 947–48 (1986) (“On the one
hand, the Court has read the establishment clause as saying that if a law’s purpose is to aid religion,
it is unconstitutional. On the other hand, the Court has read the free exercise clause as saying that,
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Importantly, the Establishment Clause is structural in nature, so that
while it allows interplay between the church and state, it also serves as a
structural restraint that removes government from matters where it might
hinder religious liberty. 252
The Establishment Clause prong of the structural unitaryaccommodationist test asks whether by allowing the symbol or practice,
a governmental institution appears to endorse or discourage a particular
religious sect or denomination. The prong is heavily posited in Justice
Rehnquist’s accommodationist interpretation of the Establishment Clause
expressed in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, which provides that “[the
Establishment Clause] d[oes] not mean that the Government should be
neutral between religion and irreligion,” but instead “it forb[ids]
establishment of a national religion, and forb[ids] preference among
religious sects or denominations.” 253 As the court recently expressed in
Van Orden, the fact that a symbol or practice “[s]imply ha[s] religious
content or promot[es] a message consistent with a religious doctrine does
not [mean the symbol or practice] run[s] afoul of the Establishment
Clause.” 254 Thus, unlike the Lemon test, the first prong of a unitaryaccommodationist test does not require that the religious symbol or
practice have a primarily secular “purpose and effect.” 255 Instead, the
religious symbol or practice is permissible (under the first prong) as long
as it does not breach the structural safeguards of the Establishment
Clause that protect free exercise rights. The safeguards guarantee that an
individual’s religious liberty is not inhibited by governmental favoritism
or religious discrimination.

under certain circumstances, the state must aid religion. Logically, the two theses are
irreconcilable.”).
252. Esbeck, supra note 23 at 62.
253. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Quoting Thomas
Cooley, Rehnquist noted,
But while thus careful to establish, protect, and defend religious freedom and equality,
the American constitutions contain no provisions which prohibit the authorities from such
solemn recognition of a superintending Providence in public transactions and exercises as
the general religious sentiment of mankind inspires, and as seems meet and proper in
finite and dependent beings. . . . Undoubtedly the spirit of the Constitution will require, in
all these cases, that care be taken to avoid discrimination in favor of or against any one
religious denomination or sect; but the power to do any of these things does not become
unconstitutional simply because of its susceptibility to abuse.
Id. at 105–06 (citations omitted).
254. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2863 (2005).
255. See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also supra notes 85–86 and
accompanying text.
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In application, the Establishment Clause prong of unitaryaccommodationism acts like the endorsement test introduced in Justice
O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence. 256 Like the endorsement test, the first
prong focuses on governmental endorsement or disapproval of specific
religious sects or denominations that might suppress free exercise
rights. 257 As Justice O’Connor noted, such endorsement “sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” 258
Unlike the endorsement test, however, a unitary-accommodationist
analysis does not evaluate the level of “entanglement” between the state
and the religious symbol or practice, nor does the test implicate religious
symbols or practices that accommodate “general”—i.e. nonspecific,
nondenominational
—religion. Striking down generally religious symbols or practices
endorsed by the government would provoke the very problems that the
endorsement test seeks to solve: religious believers would feel “that they
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and . . .
[secular] adherents [would feel] that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community.” 259 Thus, the inverse of Justice O’Connor’s
worries becomes a reality—and it is in every respect as dangerous as her
hypothesis. Ultimately, a strict application of Justice O’Connor’s
endorsement test necessitates a relentless pursuit of the elusive
“government neutrality” at the heart of the separationist doctrine. 260

256. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984).
257. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
258. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
259. Id.
260. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 273 (1998) (“[T]he endorsement test
has difficulty evaluating issues of religious accommodation.”). Under the Establishment prong, the
unitary-accommodationist test avoids the impractical aims of government neutrality. Commenting
on the unfeasibility of a neutral government regime, Paul Toscano comments,
To be truly neutral, [the government] . . . must avoid the promulgation of any assumption,
aspiration, expectation, belief structure or meaning. . . . A religiously neutral
[environment] must avoid theism because it is premised on the religious assumption that
God exists. It must also avoid atheism, because that view is premised on the equally
religious assumption that God does not exist. . . . And it cannot promote agnosticism,
which assumes that the existence of God is not or cannot be known—a view that, like
others, is religious because it constitutes a positive and non-neutral a position as the
proposition that God’s existence can be known.
TOSCANO, supra note 42, at 15–16.
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Instead of imposing a regime where the accommodation of religion
might be perceived as an impermissible endorsement of religion, the first
prong of unitary-accommodationism seeks a more feasible form of
neutrality by sanctioning of a wide range of views without specifically
endorsing any one belief.
B. A Unitary Reading: The Free Exercise Threshold
Alone, the first prong of the unitary-accommodationist test does not
adequately deal with Free Exercise Clause considerations in its
Establishment Clause analysis. The government might endorse a
generally religious symbol or practice that passes under the first prong
(by virtue that the symbol or practice does not reflect a specific religious
tenet or belief) but still inhibits a person’s Free Exercise Clause liberties.
The second prong thus considers whether the contested symbol or
practice permits a reasonable individual to project his religious beliefs on
the symbol or practice, thus allowing him to enjoy his free exercise right
to religious liberty. Fundamentally, a court must analyze the nature of the
religious symbol or practice and whether it allows an individual to bring
his personal values and religious beliefs to the table. For example, a
general or innocuous religious statement that accommodates many
different kinds of religions would not inhibit free exercise rights.
Religious elements that are little more than religious umbrella statements
likely would not violate the second prong of the unitaryaccommodationism test.
The second prong of unitary-accommodationism is an inverse
reading of Justice Kennedy’s coercion test, which provides that
“government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any
religion or its exercise.” 261 Unlike the coercion test, unitaryaccommodationism does not ask whether governmental accommodation
of a symbol or practice prevents an individual from exercising his free
exercise rights, but whether it permits an individual to realize those
rights. Like the coercion test, the second unitary-accommodationism
prong assesses only the potential effect of the religious symbol or
practice on an individual’s free exercise rights rather than its actual
effect.
The second prong is similar to Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test
in that both tests apply a reasonable observer 262 standard when
261. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989).
262. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 784 (1995).
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determining the effect of the religious symbol or practice on an
individual. While the reasonable observer standard has been criticized as
unworkable since a person’s reaction to a symbol or practice might
“var[y] with [his or her] religious standpoint,” 263 courts need not
determine what constitutes a “reasonable denomination” or “reasonable
religious belief” but only what level of religious devotion might be
considered representative of the paradigmatic citizen. Courts will
inevitably vary slightly in their judgments of what is considered
reasonable.
V. UNITARY-ACCOMMODATION THEORY APPLIED
The structural unitary-accommodationist test provides a more
practical Establishment Clause standard that addresses the need to unify
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause rights as well as
accommodate a wide variety of religious and nonreligious beliefs. The
following section outlines several hypothetical Religion Clause cases and
hypothesizes on the future of religious jurisprudence in the courts,
finding that the structural unitary-accommodationist test may provide a
workable solution to the free exercise and inconsistency dilemmas
engendered in modern Religion Clause jurisprudence..264
A. Religious Ceremony: The Pledge of Allegiance
In 2004, Michael Newdow challenged the constitutionality of a
public school policy permitting daily recitation of the Pledge of
Allegiance, which includes the words “under God.” 265 Although
students were not required to participate in the exercise, Newdow and the
lower court claimed that by endorsing the Pledge, the government was
“putting the idea of God” in [students’] minds. 266 The Supreme Court
declined to rule whether the Pledge or the school policy breached the
Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses, finding instead that Newdow—
263. FARBER, supra note 260, at 273. Noting the difficulty of the “reasonable observer”
standard, Daniel Farber comments, “Whose reaction determines whether the message is one of
endorsement? It is not easy to specify what kind of person operates as the bellwether (the reasonable
member of a minority religion? The average citizen? The most sensitive person?), or what
information they have available (in particular, how well do they understand the legal context?).” Id.
264. The following brief analyses are in nowise designed to provide an exhaustive
examination of the complex Religion Clause question, but are designed to highlight the main points
of analysis that would be involved in an application of the structural unitary-accommodationist test.
265. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, (2004).
266. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624).
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the father of a student from the Pledge-reciting school—had no standing
to bring the case. Dicta from the decision suggest, however, that the
Court would potentially find the words “under God” constitutional under
a ceremonial deist argument that declared the words secular. 267
Applying the analysis set forth in this Comment under a hypothetical
nonmandatory school Pledge case like the one above, a court would
begin a structural unitary-accommodationist test by analyzing whether
the words “under God” endorse or discourage a specific religion or
religious belief. Second, the court would evaluate whether the Pledge
policy allows a reasonable individual to project his religious beliefs—i.e.
exercise his or her religion—on the Pledge. Importantly, the court’s
holding cannot accommodate every claimed religious tenet but must
fairly satisfy as many beliefs as possible. 268
Under the first prong of the unitary-accommodationist test, the words
“under God” do not point to a specific religion or religious belief. The
word “God” is not defined by any single concept. In the Talmud, “God is
the place of the world, but the world is not God’s place,” 269 and in the
Bible, God is “Love,” 270 “the Word,” 271 “the LORD of Hosts” and “the
first, and . . . the last.” 272 Hindus worship the God, Brahma, “the eternal
origin who is the cause and foundation of all existence.” 273
Scientologists “affirm[] the existence of a Supreme Being.” 274 Muslims
believe in Allah, an “eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent” God. 275
Pagans find God “in many different forms,” 276 and Unitary Universalists

267. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1. In oral argument, Justice Souter suggested that the phrase “under
God” was constitutional because those words no longer indicate a religious principle but rather a
historic concept “so tepid, so diluted” that it flies beneath the “constitutional radar.” He further
commented, “the religious, as distinct from a civic content, is close to disappearing here.” Transcript
of Oral Argument at 39, Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (No. 02-1624).
268. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 597 (1992) (“[Not] every . . . action implicating
religion is invalid if one or a few citizens find it offensive.”).
269. Genesis Rabbah 68:9.
270. 1 John 4:8.
271. John 1:1.
272. Isaiah 44:6.
273. Religion
and
Ethics:
Hinduism,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/
hinduism/beliefs/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
274. Church of Scientology International, Concept of God, http://www.scientology.org/
html/opencms/cos/scientology/en_US/news-media/faq/pg015.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/
275. Religion
and
Ethics:
Islam,
beliefs/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/
276. Religion
and
Ethics:
Paganism,
paganism/beliefs/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
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define God loosely as “a spirit of life or a power within themselves,
which some choose to call God.” 277 To the atheist, God is man’s
primitive “explanation[] for all phenomena.” 278 To others, God is no
more than “the extraordinary process called Life.” 279 Thus, in the
American experience, God exists as a near-universal concept “down
under all the variousnesses [sic] in humanity’s religious representations
of him and therefore [is] equally accessible ultimately by means of any
and all reverent religious methodologies.” 280 With such wide-ranging
and abstruse connotations, a court might easily find that the words
“under God” do not favor a particular religion’s tenets. 281 Additionally,
the words “under God” cannot be said to endorse a specific religion that
would implicate free exercise rights. The expression of America as “one
nation under God” cannot be said to endorse a single belief. To a
Christian, America might be said to be “under an accessible,
monotheistic God.” To a Jew, America could be “under an unknowable,
undefined, yet omnipresent God.” Even to an atheist, America might be
“under a concept of progress which man historically refers to as
‘God.’” 282
277. Religion and Ethics: Atheism, http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/atheism/
types/uuism.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
278. GORA ATHEIST CENTER, ATHEISM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1992), available at
http://www.positiveatheism.org/india/gora31.htm.
279. Todd Leopold, Meet the New God, CNN, June 14, 2004, available at
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/SHOWBIZ/books/06/14/tomorrows.god/index.html (quoted in NEALE
DONALD WALSCH, TOMORROW’S GOD: OUR GREATEST SPIRITUAL CHALLENGE (Atria 2004)).
280. TICKLE, supra note 15, at 117.
281. Importantly, the words “under God” were initially included in the Pledge as
representation of a Christian-Judaic God. A 1954 House Resolution on the addition of “under God”
to the Pledge noted, “recognition of God as the Creator of mankind, and the ultimate source both of
the rights of man and of the powers of government . . . [is] the basis of the political philosophy on
which the Federal Government and all the State governments were built and continue to operate.”
H.R. Res. 1693, 83d Cong. (1954) (enacted). Despite these originally limited interpretations of God,
the concept has undeniably expanded to fit the needs of a multicultural, pluralistic nation. The
interpretations of the Pledge’s authors need not define a modern citizen’s understanding of the
Pledge.
282. Some might argue that the words “under God” fundamentally evoke a Protestant
Christian god, since this is likely the god envisioned by the authors who added the words to the
Pledge. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1693, 83d Cong. (1954) (enacted) (noting that the addition of the words
“under God” to the Pledge is a “recognition of God as the Creator of mankind, and the ultimate
source both of the rights of man and of the powers of government . . . [and] the basis of the political
philosophy on which the Federal Government and all the State governments were built and continue
to operate”). However, the focus of the structural unitary-accommodationist test is not what the
symbol or practice means to its proponents, or the governmental purpose or intent behind the
symbol’s institution. Rather, the focus is on the different meanings that an individual might
reasonably impose on the symbol or practice.
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Under the second prong of the unitary-accommodationist test, a court
would analyze whether a reasonable person could project his individual
beliefs on the Pledge. Under this hypothetical, the school Pledge policy
does not force a student to participate in the Pledge. In fact, as of 1943,
no school policy can make the recitation of the Pledge mandatory. 283
Students are not required to pledge allegiance to the flag; they may also
say the Pledge without the traditional “hand over heart” gesture, and they
may pledge without invoking the words “under God.” 284 Additionally,
the Pledge does not compel only one belief. The innocuous and
potentially secular words 285 “under God” allow a student to impose his
views—religious or otherwise—on the pledge act. To some, pledging
“under God” may invoke a religious affirmation. To others, it might
represent no more than a patriotic exercise. 286 Given the inclusive nature
of the phrase, the Pledge serves as an umbrella statement that allows an
individual to bring his personal values and religious or nonreligious
beliefs to the table. The phrase violates no Establishment Clause
constraints and likewise passes Free Exercise Clause muster. Under a
structural unitary-accommodationist test, it is constitutional.
B. Religious Displays: The Ten Commandments
The Supreme Court is divided on the constitutionality of Ten
Commandments displays, and in two recent cases, the high Court ruled
283. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
284. In 2004, a Colorado statute permitting teachers to lead students in the Pledge daily, but
allowing students to opt out of recitation with parental permission, was challenged in federal court.
The plaintiffs alleged that in being asked to say the pledge, even with exemption provisions, violated
their “rights to be free from state-compelled expression.” H.B. 04-1002, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Co. 2004). The case was stayed until the end of the legislative season when the statute was
amended. The new law provides, “Any person not wishing to participate in the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance shall be exempt from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance and need not
participate.” Id.
285. Under a ceremonial deist argument, the words “under God” might be viewed as a secular
phrase that evokes only the historical vestiges of America’s founding. For example, the concurrence
in a recent Supreme Court decision indicated that “under God” passed constitutional muster because
the words referred only to the Pledge’s ceremonial history. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1, 8–16 (2004)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). In his majority opinion, Justice Stevens referred to the Pledge as a
“patriotic exercise,” and Justice O’Connor called it a permissible example of “ceremonial deism.” Id.
at 2323. In oral argument, Justice Souter suggested that the phrase “under God” was constitutional
because those words no longer indicate a religious principle, but rather a historic concept “so tepid,
so diluted” that it flies beneath the “constitutional radar.” Respondent’s Oral Argument at 39, Elk
Grove, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624). He further commented that “the religious, as distinct from
a civic content, is close to disappearing here.” Id.
286. Elk Grove, 542 U.S. 1.
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five to four that a historic Ten Commandments monument on the Texas
Capitol grounds passed constitutional muster, 287 while Ten
Commandments posters in two county courthouses did not. 288 The
rulings indicate that the Court’s benchmark standard for the
constitutionality of the displays was the intent of the exhibits—the
monument on Texas grounds constituted a “broad[] moral and historical
message reflective of a cultural heritage,” 289 while the courtroom posters
exhibited a “religious rather than secular” “foundational value.” 290
Although the Court failed to apply one specific Establishment Clause test
to the cases, the plurality ruling in Van Orden appears to adopt a
ceremonial deist argument that analyzes the “historical message” of the
Commandments 291 while the McCreary plurality touches on Lemon’s
secular “purpose and effect” test. 292 A structural unitaryaccommodationist analysis of the Ten Commandments question resolves
many of the inconsistencies raised in these recent decisions.
For the purposes of a unitary-accommodationist analysis, the
following hypothetical considers the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display similar to the one in Van Orden (minus any
potential historic messages included on the monument). As explained
above, a court would first address whether by allowing the Ten
Commandments display, the government appears to endorse or
discourage a particular religious sect or denomination. Next, the court
would analyze whether a reasonable individual could project his
religious beliefs on the display. Notably, the court does not have to find
287. The six-foot stone monument prominently displayed the Ten Commandments, with
carvings of “an eagle grasping the American flag, an eye inside of a pyramid, and two small tablets
with what appears to be an ancient script” along the top. Below the Ten Commandments text are
“two Stars of David and the superimposed Greek letters Chi and Rho, which represent Christ.” Van
Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2858 (2005).
288. The posters were displayed beside copies of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of
Independence, the Bill of Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact,
the National Motto, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice.
Together, the display was entitled, “The Foundations of American Law and Government.” McCreary
County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2731 (2005).
289. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
290. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2731.
291. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2857 (“The public visiting the capitol grounds is more likely to
have considered the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of what is a broader moral and
historical message reflective of a cultural heritage. For these reasons, the Texas display falls on the
permissible side of the constitutional line.”).
292. The McCreary County plurality commented, “We hold only that purpose needs to be
taken seriously under the Establishment Clause and needs to be understood in light of context.”
McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2741.
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against the display if it holds both religious and secular meaning since
there is “no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for
government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against
efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.” 293
A court might begin a structural unitary-accommodationist analysis
by considering the nature of the Ten Commandments generally. The
Commandments, also known as the Decalogue, encompass religious
values espoused by Christianity, Judiaism, and Islam. The
Commandments also constitute the basis of Western Civilization’s moral
foundation, which has since been translated into what is generally known
as common law. 294 The Ten Commandments play an important role in
the Nation’s heritage and provide a framework for social and legal
justice. 295 Thus, “[w]hile the Commandments are religious, they have an
undeniable historical meaning.” 296 The principles ensconced in the
Decalogue embody not just the tenets of religion, but the cannons of our
country. Therefore, it would be difficult for a court to show that a Ten
Commandments monument represents only a particular sect or
denomination. 297
The second prong of the unitary-accommodationist test asks whether
a reasonable person could project his religious beliefs on the Ten
Commandments memorial. First, courts must ascertain the ways in which
a viewer might perceive the monument. Is the monument a statement of
the history of law? Is it testimony of the government’s devotion to
Christianity, Judaism, or Islam? Does the monument assert that Moses
was a divinely led prophet? Or that he even existed at all? Is it merely a
statement of the country’s origins? Here, a Christian might view the
monument as a demonstration of God’s rule of law, where an atheist
might see it as a manifestation of common law’s historic antiquity.
Where a government display engenders numerous, potentially religious,

293. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–14 (1952).
294. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45 (1980) (“It is . . . undeniable . . . that the Ten
Commandments have had a significant impact on the development of secular legal codes of the
Western World.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (noting that “state prohibitions
of murder, theft and adultery reinforce commands of the decalogue”).
295. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2863.
296. Id. at 2856.
297. Like the Pledge analysis, one might argue that a Ten Commandments display does serve
a specifically religious purpose and reflects the religious motives of the display proponents. Again,
the structural unitary-accommodationist test is not concerned with the specific intent of the
government in permitting the display or the level of “entanglement” between the state and the
religious symbol or practice. See supra notes 260–65, 289–90 and accompanying text.
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potentially secular interpretations, none of which inhibit a reasonable
individual’s exercise of belief, a court must find that the display does not
breach Free Exercise Clause limitations. Under unitaryaccommodationism, displays of the Ten Commandments pass
constitutional muster.
C. Religious Practices: School Prayer
In Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court ruled that a
nondenominational, voluntary school prayer violated Establishment
Clause standards because the “union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.” 298 Two decades later, the
Court found that a one-minute period of silence also violated the
Establishment Clause because it failed the secular purpose and effect
prong of the Lemon test. 299 Most recently, the Court ruled that an
invocation offered during high school commencement 300 and a studentled prayer offered at a school football game similarly violated Lemon
secular standards. 301
A unitary-accommodationist analysis of the constitutionality of
public school prayer would first ask if a nondenominational prayer
endorses or discourages a particular religious sect or denomination.
Second, the test would analyze whether a school-offered prayer policy
permits a reasonable person to project his religious beliefs on the prayer.
Under the first prong, a court would be hard pressed to find a
nondenominational prayer that didn’t favor a particular sect or
denomination. Prayer is generally defined as “an address ([or] petition)
to God or a god in word or thought.” 302 Thus, one might recite the
“Submariner’s Prayer,” 303 a St. Cosmus & St. Damian’s parish
prayer, 304 an ancient Jain “prayer of love for all,” 305 the Oglala Sioux
298. 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
299. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985).
300. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U. S. 577 (1992).
301. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U. S. 290 (2000).
302. Merriam
Webster
OnLine,
“Prayer,”
http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/prayer/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
303. “Almighty, Everlasting God, the Protector of all those who put their trust in Thee: hear
our prayers in behalf of Thy servants who sail their vessels beneath the seas . . . .” World Prayers
Index, http://www.worldprayers.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
304. “Lord God, Giver of Life, Source of all healing, who alone can help us grow in
wholeness: We thank you for the gift of life and health, and remembering your faithful servants
Cosmus and Damian we ask you to guide and uphold all doctors, surgeons, hospital staffs and all
engaged in the ministry of healing . . . .” Id.
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“offering of the pipe,” 306 a New Age “invocation of the soul,” 307 the
Celtic “Carmina Gadelica,” 308 or one of King David’s psalms. 309
Because the act of public prayer necessitates a single-voiced invocation,
it precludes the broad range of interpretations available to a participant
under a Ten Commandments or Pledge analysis. 310 Where an individual
views a Decalogue monument, he may invoke numerous religious and
secular interpretations, 311 and when he recites the Pledge, he may pledge
in various ways, with or without the words “under God.” 312 With public
prayer, however, an individual has less interpretive latitude and little
opportunity to modify the prayer or the way in which he prays, especially
where the individual is not offering the prayer himself. The act of prayer
also discriminates against “nonbelievers” who do not accept a sentient
God since in the act of praying one implies the existence of a higher
source. A school-led prayer thus does not pass the first prong of unitaryaccommodationism.
In addition, government-sponsored prayer likely would not satisfy
the second prong of unitary-accommodationism. The act of praying
necessitates some belief that a God exists, the God is sentient, and the
God is capable of receiving prayers. An individual’s concept of God is
305. “Satveshu Maitrim Gunishu Pramodham, Klishteshu Jivehu Krupa Parathvam,
Madhyastha Bhavam Viparita Vruthow, Sada Mamatma Viddhatu Deva.” Id.
306. “Grandfather, Great Spirit, you have been always, and before you no one has been. There
is no other one to pray to but you. You yourself, everything that you see, everything that has been
made by you . . . .” Id.
307. “I am the Soul. I am the Light Divine. I am Love. I am Will. I am Fixed Design.” Id.
308. “Valiant Nuada of the white sword, Who subdued the Firbolg of blood, For love of the
Tribe, for pains of Danu’s children, Hold thy shield over us, protect us all . . . .” Id.
309. “Lord, I cry unto thee: make haste unto me; give ear unto my voice, when I cry unto thee.
Let my prayer be set forth before thee as incense; and the lifting of my hands as the evening
sacrifice.” Psalm 141:1–2.
310. The American Atheists note the difficulty of adopting a single nondenominational prayer,
or even a “rotating” multi-denominational prayer:
What sort of a “prayer” would [a nondenominational one] be? Many religious groups are
skeptical about organized school prayer because they fear that doctrines and prayers of
other religions may be used. . . . [T]here are hundreds, even thousands of diverse
religious beliefs. Many would clamor for ‘equal time’ in this prayer lottery. How would
Catholics react to having, say, Jewish Orthodox prayers read? What happens if a
Scientologist, or Seventh-Day Adventist, or Satanist demands that prayers from those
sects be used? Communities, schools, and ultimately students would become divided
against each other in a religious free-for-all.
American Atheists, FAQ’s About Prayer in Schools, http://www.atheists.org/publicschools/
faqs.prayer.html#offend.
311. See supra notes 294–97 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 269–82 and accompanying text.
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therefore limited by the very nature of prayer. This differs from the
Pledge analysis where the words “under God” do not circumscribe
specific deistic characteristics, or the Ten Commandments assessment
where a monument does not dictate the nature of God’s law.
Additionally, religious freedom is limited by a school-offered prayer
since one need not offer the prayer personally to have indirectly
participated in the prayer. 313 This differs from the Pledge analysis where
a person may remove the words “under God” from his personal pledge or
refrain from pledging entirely. Ultimately, free exercise rights are limited
under a school prayer policy so that the practice is unconstitutional. 314
VI. CONCLUSION
The twentieth and early twenty-first century trends in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence are troubling ones, especially when viewed in light
of Free Exercise Clause deficiencies. Certainly, courts must adopt a new
understanding of establishment and free exercise doctrines if religious
liberty is to be maintained. The structural unitary-accommodationist test
offers a solution to persistent Religion Clause inconsistencies that
threaten religious belief. Primarily, the test resolves the free exercise
dilemma raised by modern Religion Clause tests that overlook free
exercise considerations in an Establishment Clause context. Additionally,
the structural unitary-accommodationist test resolves many of the
disparities engendered in current Religious Clause jurisprudence.
Correcting such deficiencies is vital, for if courts continue to adopt freeexercise-inhibiting and inconsistent doctrine, our nation risks becoming
the very fortress of religious persecution our forefathers sought to flee.
We must cling to our religious rights and defend the freedom to believe.
To do otherwise would not only spurn the sacrifice of our Pilgrim
parentage but also defeat the founding principle of our nation.
Carolyn A. Deverich

313. A person can be said to participate in prayer when he is merely present during the prayer
offering.
314. Notably, a moment of silence does not encounter the same problems as a voiced prayer.
Under a structural unitary-accommodationist test, a moment of silence would likely pass muster
since a person is not required to pray, or even acknowledge a higher being, during the silence. But cf.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985) (holding that a one-minute period of silence violated the
Establishment Clause because it failed the secular purpose and effect prong of the Lemon test).
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